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connections can share these risks, but also create the means by which shocks can propagate. We
examine this tradeoff in the context of a new stylised fact we present: German banks are more likely
to have financial connections when they face more similar risks—potentially undermining the risk
sharing role of financial connections and contributing to systemic risk. We find that such patterns are
socially suboptimal, but can be explained by risk-shifting. Risk-shifting motivates banks to correlate
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1 Introduction
In the financial system, systemic risk comes from two sources. First, banks may be exposed to the same
real investments. Second, banks have financial exposure to each other. In either case, shocks to the real
economy can spread across the financial system. As emphasised by policymakers (e.g. Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, 2011), the interaction between real exposure and financial exposure is key for
financial stability. Conventional wisdom argues banks should prefer counterparties with different real
exposure. Then banks can share real risks across the financial system (Rochet and Tirole, 1996; Allen
and Gale, 2000). But financial connections often play the opposite role. Banks often have similar real
exposures to their financial counterparties. Financial connections then concentrate real risk. After a shock
to the real economy, banks are doubly affected—first, through their direct exposure, and second through
their indirect exposure via their financial counterparties. In the United States, various anecdotes from
the 2008 financial crisis display this pattern. Many institutions had the same real exposure as their
financial counterparties, which raised systemic risk:
• Among US commercial banks, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives trading was concentrated at the
five largest banks. These banks were financially exposed to one another, while at the same time
faced the same real exposure to the housing market.1
• Investment banks used monoline insurers to share their subprime mortgage risk, but these mono-
line insurers, through their asset management and collateralised debt obligation (CDO) arms, had
the same real exposure to subprime mortgages.2
We make two contributions. First, we present a new stylized fact from the German banking system.
Banks have similar real exposures to their financial counterparties. So, if German commercial banks
lend to one another in the interbank market, they tend to lend to similar non-financial firms. Second, we
rationalise this behaviour and show it generates systemic risk. We study a model with limited liability,
real investments, and a financial network. We characterise socially efficient networks. In these networks,
which minimise systemic risk, banks have different real exposures from their counterparties. Absent
limited liability, banks have no incentive to deviate from the socially efficient network. But limited
liability leads banks to deviate from social efficiency and engage in systemic risk shifting. Banks increase
their equity values by having the same real exposures as their close financial counterparties. Then banks
fail at the same time as their counterparties, raising their values conditional on not failing and hence their
equity values, but also increasing systemic risk.
The German commercial banking system is an ideal setting to study the relationship between banks’
financial and real exposures. Supervisory data from the German Credit Register records the near-
universe of bank-bank and bank-firm lending. Interbank loans proxy for financial exposures, and com-
mercial loans proxy for real exposures. Large interbank exposures, with long-term maturities, create
substantial counterparty risk in the financial system.3 Bank-firm lending is the largest class of real in-
1See, for example, the report of the 2011 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.
2SEC, “Risk Management Reviews of Consolidated Supervised Entities,” internal memo to Erik Sirri and others, November
6, 2007, p. 3.
3The share of interbank lending over equity is 17% for banks at the mean of our sample and 128% at the 99th percentile.
Interbank loans have an average maturity of more than one year.
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vestments for most banks.4 So, Upper and Worms (2004) and others argue that shocks to firms or sectors
can lead to systemic risk in the German financial system.
Figure 1 illustrates our stylised fact. Banks with more similar real exposures tend to lend more to
each other. The figure relates the similarity between two banks’ non-financial portfolios, and the size
of their net interbank lending in a given quarter. We calculate a measure of each bank pair’s portfolio
similarity, based on the overlap in the portfolio of firms to which they lend in a given quarter, and rank
all bank pairs by this measure. We residualise by a set of fixed effects and then relate this measure
to interbank lending between each bank pair. We present the result in a binned scatterplot. Portfolio
similarity and interbank lending are significantly and positively related. The effect is large. When two
banks move from the 25th to the 75th percentile of non-financial similarity, their net lending to one
another increases by about 31% or EUR. 13.8 million. The results are statistically significant, robust to
restricting only to banks with national coverage, and hold after adding borrower-by-quarter, lender-by-
quarter and borrower-lender fixed effects.5 Our main measure of real exposure comes from overlap in
banks’ portfolios at the firm level, but our findings also hold with the analogous sectoral measure of
similarity.
The general pattern that more similar nodes are more likely to link to each other in a network is
known as homophily. Encapsulated in the proverb that “birds of a feather flock together,” this pattern
has been noticed since at least the 16th century. Homophily is a robust feature in networks.6 Our results
document homophily in a new, and perhaps surprising, setting—the German banking system.
We develop a model to understand this pattern and explore the consequences for systemic risk. The
model has three key ingredients: real investments, a financial network, and limited liability. There is
a set of financial institutions, termed banks. There is a set of real investments that generate random
returns. Each bank holds a portfolio of the investments. Banks can hold any share in any investment.
Banks also hold financial claims on one another. These claims form a financial network. Banks’ market
values are determined by the investment returns flowing to each bank. Banks have liabilities to external
debt holders. The residual market value, after external debt, becomes equity value. In states of the
world where market values are less than the value of external debt, banks fail. These failures trigger
discontinuous falls in the value of financial claims, due to default costs. By limited liability, equity value
is zero if banks fail.
Our model captures a tradeoff between two priorities: risk sharing, and minimizing systemic risk. By
holding multiple real investments or financial claims on counterparties, banks share the risks associated
with a given investment. But both investment portfolios and the financial network lead to systemic
risk. If multiple banks hold the same investment, they may all simultaneously fail if the investment
has a low return. If banks hold financial claims on one another, then a second bank may fail if a first
bank’s portfolio has a low return. Default costs amplify systemic risk by lowering the value of claims
the second bank has with the first bank, when the first bank fails.
Our model makes two points. First, the pattern in the data—where banks have similar real exposures
to their financial counterparties—is not socially efficient. We characterize the socially efficient networks
4The average bank in our sample has about 10 times as much in loans to the real economy as equity. Given the low rate of
home ownership in Germany, residential lending is small for most banks.
5Banks with national coverage exclude regional banks such as savings central banks (Landesbanken).
6See McPherson et al. (2001) for a survey.
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Notes: the y-axis is log of net quarterly interbank lending between each pair of commercial banks in the German Credit Register
for 2006-2014. The x-axis is the rank of how similar two banks’ commercial loan portfolios are in a quarter, based on the overlap
of the firms to which each bank lends. We residualize both variables against time, lender and borrower fixed effects, and plot
a binned scatter with 20 points.
and portfolios. Banks should hold different investments from their closest financial counterparties. This
structure minimizes the likelihood that a bank’s portfolio draws bad returns at the same time as its
counterparties. Collectively, the banking system then absorbs fewer losses, which lowers the risk of bank
failures. Our characterisation reveals an additional subtlety. The social planner optimally partitions the
financial network into groups of banks, with strong financial claims within groups, and weak claims
between groups. This network prevents failures after relatively small falls in investment returns, and
minimizes systemic risk after large falls in returns. The weak financial claims between groups prevent
failures from spreading throughout the network.
Second we show that the socially efficient outcome does not arise in equilibrium. Instead, consistent
with the stylized fact, banks seek to have the same real exposure as their financial counterparties. The
reason for this behavior is limited liability. The result of this behavior is greater systemic risk. So, limited
liability creates behavior that we and others term systemic risk shifting.7
We isolate the role of limited liability through two steps. In the first step, we show deviations from
the socially efficient outcome cannot raise banks’ expected market values—where market values are the
sum of external debt and equity. In a deviation, banks can change either their financial claims or their
7See Acharya (2009) for an earlier use of the term.
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investment portfolios. Deviating from the socially efficient outcome increases the expected number of
failures. These failures create default costs, which lower the market value of the deviating banks through
the interconnectedness of the network. So, the socially efficient outcome can arise in equilibrium, if
banks maximize market value. Social efficiency occurs even though changes in a bank’s portfolio or
financial claims impose externalities on other banks.
In the second step, we show banks can raise their equity values by deviating from the socially effi-
cient outcome. Limited liability, which creates the difference between equity and market value, leads to
socially inefficient behavior. With limited liability, banks increase their expected equity value by failing
at the same time as their closest counterparties. Then neither is affected by the default costs associated
with the other’s failure. Instead, external debtors lose value from counterparties’ default costs. These
deviations raise banks’ market value when they do not fail, leading to higher equity value on average.
Moreover these deviations raise systemic risk—the chance that a large share of the network fails. So,
there is systemic risk shifting. Changes in either portfolios or financial claims can lead to systemic risk
shifting. Either change can raise equity value, if banks become more likely to fail at the same time as
their counterparties.
Related Literature
Our paper falls within the financial networks literature. The literature examining how the structure of
exogenous financial networks affects systemic risk has expanded rapidly. Building on early important
works, such as Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000), this literature emphasises
that interconnections can spread contagion. Networks can generate systemic risk by facilitating the
spread of relatively large shocks (Gai and Kapadia, 2010), or by interacting with various propagation
mechanisms, such as bankruptcy costs (Elliott, Golub, and Jackson, 2014); uncertainty about banks’ bal-
ance sheets (Caballero and Simsek, 2013; Alvarez and Barlevy, 2014); and fire sales (Cifuentes, Ferrucci,
and Shin, 2005). Correlated exposures have also been shown to make an important contribution to sys-
temic risk (Glasserman and Young, 2015) and will amplify the impact of the other mechanisms. Allen
and Babus (2009) and Capponi (2016) survey this literature. Since these papers consider exogenous net-
works and fixed real exposures, they do not examine socially efficient network structures, nor whether
individual banks might choose to deviate from the social optimum.
Most papers studying financial networks empirically focus on characterising the network structure
to identify the risk of contagion (see Upper and Worms (2004) and Craig and von Peter (2014) for an
analysis of the German interbank network structure). Craig and Ma (2018) develop a structural model
of the German interbank market to study the potential for systemic risk.8 A few papers empirically
study contagion and systemic risk in financial networks (Furfine, 2003; Iyer and Peydro, 2011; Denbee
et al., 2014; Anderson, Paddrik, and Wang, 2019; Anderson, Erol, and Ordoñez, 2020). To the best of our
knowledge, however, there is no prior empirical paper studying whether banks lend to counterparties
with a similar loan portfolio.
8Since we are interested in the creation of new links, we use the actual transfer of funds between two banks to denote
interbank lending (i.e. a flow variable). In contrast, Craig and Ma (2018) are interested in credit risk and use the reported
exposure from historical fund transfers (i.e. a stock variable) to denote interbank exposures.
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A smaller literature focuses on socially efficient network structures and the endogenous formation of
financial networks, in the presence of systemic risk (see, for example, Gofman, 2017). A major departure
we make from this literature is by considering the joint choice of financial and real exposures. Our
analysis is motivated by the stylised fact that banks are more likely to lend to other banks who have
similar real exposures. Both financial and real exposure choices are required to explain this observation.9
Two papers close to ours, studying socially efficient network structures, are Cabrales, Gottardi, and
Vega-Redondo (2017) and Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015a). Both examine social effi-
ciency in the context of financial contagion. Acemoglu et al. (2015a) identify a key tradeoff facing the
social planner. Denser connections prevent bankruptcies from small shocks, but facilitate the spread of
contagion from large shocks. Therefore highly connected networks are optimal if all shocks are relatively
small. Conversely, if shocks are always large, then weak connections in the network can enhance sta-
bility by preventing the spread of contagion. Our paper builds on this analysis by considering socially
efficient networks when shocks hitting the system can be both large or small with positive probability;
and introduces an amplification mechanism via default costs.
Cabrales et al. (2017) study the same key tradeoff governing social efficiency as in our paper—how
to limit contagion, while also allowing risk-sharing. They study considerably more general shock dis-
tributions than us. Their first set of results can be viewed as a substantial and important generalization
of the Acemoglu et al. (2015a) insight. They find that when shocks are sufficiently fat tailed, the trade-
off is resolved by minimising the chance of contagion and forming a maximally segmented network.
When shocks are sufficiently thin tailed, the tradeoff is resolved by maximising risk-sharing in a fully
integrated network structure. For intermediate shock distributions, their results are consistent with our
findings. They find conditions under which the strength of connections in the network takes at most
two values. We take this as suggestive that the forces we study apply more generally than our two point
shock distributions. What we get from our more restrictive shock distribution, in combination with in-
cluding costs of financial distress, is that the pattern in which these links are organised is crucial. We are
able to characterise the socially optimal patterns. Links between different groups of highly connected
banks must be weak, to contain financial distress costs after one group fails.
A growing literature considers endogenous network formation.10 We discuss three papers closely
related to ours. Each examines why privately and socially optimal behavior might differ. First, in Far-
boodi (2014), banks form links due to intermediation, since some banks have access to risky investment
opportunities or funding opportunities, and others do not. Banks also intermediate to capture rents.
Impressively, Farboodi (2014) succeeds in finding equilibrium networks, and the equilibrium structure
she identifies matches empirically observed financial networks—there is a core of investment banks
connected to each other, each with links to a set a commercial banks. In her model private behavior
is socially inefficient because core banks behave in an excessively risky manner, to capture intermedia-
tion rents. Second, Acemoglu et al. (2015b) also focusses on financial intermediation as the reason for
9Subsequent to us, Jackson and Pernoud (2019) also investigate this interaction. We compare their results to ours later in
the paper.
10Papers considering related problems include Leitner (2005), Blume et al. (2011), Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012), Babus
(2016), Zawadowski (2013), Eisert and Eufinger (2018), Erol and Vohra (2014), Di Maggio and Tahbaz-Salehi (2014), Wang
(2014), Cohen-Cole, Patacchini, and Zenou (2015), Galeotti, Ghiglino, and Goyal (2015), Cabrales et al. (2017), Erol and Ordoñez
(2017), Galeotti et al. (2017), Kanik (2017), Bernard, Capponi, and Stiglitz (2017), Craig and Ma (2018), Chang and Zhang (2018)
and Stanton, Walden, and Wallace (2018).
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network formation. Privately and socially efficient behavior may diverge because of a financial net-
work externality—banks contract on a bilateral basis, and so do not account for their role in creating
a conduit that allows idiosyncratic shocks to develop into contagion. In our model, systemic risk also
arises endogenously but from a different set of frictions, pertaining to risk-shifting. The stylised fact we
present, that banks correlate their real exposures with their largest counterparties, is suggestive that this
friction plays a role in practice, although other frictions may of course also matter. Third, Erol (2015)
introduces government bailouts into a model of network formation among firms with bilateral expo-
sures. Anticipating bailouts leads to “network hazard”—firms become less concerned about the choice
of their counterparties’ own counterparties. In equilibrium, highly connected central firms emerge in
the network. Different from our model, however, firms do not decide to correlate their real and financial
exposures.
Outside the networks literature, the role of risk-shifting in generating financial instability has been
widely discussed in the context of a single-firm framework (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Relatively
little work considers risk-shifting in a systemic setting. A first exception is Acharya (2009). We build
on Acharya (2009) by combining portfolio choice of real investments with network choices of financial
connections. This raises new questions and allows us to provide suggestive evidence consistent with
risk-shifting through portfolio choices in a network setting. A second exception is Farhi and Tirole
(2012). In their model, banks face liquidity risk. Authorities can intervene to improve liquidity. They
uncover a strategic complementarity. Each bank increases liquidity risk if other banks also have greater
liquidity risk. Then banks are likely to be illiquid at the same time, which prompts an intervention from
authorities. Our model also identifies a strategic complementarity, but the source is different: arising
from limited liability instead of intervention by authorities.
We structure the paper as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 examines socially efficient
networks. Section 4 discusses equilibrium networks. Section 5 provides several robustness checks for
the stylised fact that banks have similar real and financial exposure. Proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
2 The Model
We introduce a model to rationalize the stylized fact we presented in the introduction. The model
has three key ingredients. First, banks have financial claims on one another. Second, banks make real
investments. Third, there is limited liability. With these ingredients, we ask whether it is socially efficient
for banks to choose the same real exposures as their financial counterparties—as in the stylized fact—
and whether socially efficient outcomes will arise in equilibrium.
2.1 Banks, Investments, and Financial Claims
Banks. There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of financial institutions, which we refer to as banks. The economy
lasts for three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. In period 0, each bank issues debt with face value v to external debtors,
that is, entities outside the financial system.
Investment Portfolio. In period 1, each bank chooses a portfolio of investments which yield a
stochastic return. The return generated by bank i’s portfolio is pi. There is one unit available for each of
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n types of investment. We let φi ∈ ∆n denote bank i’s portfolio, where ∆n is the n-dimensional simplex,
and use φik ∈ [0, 1] to denote the share of i’s portfolio in investment k. Portfolios φ := {φi}i satisfies
∑i φik = 1, so the return on all investments goes to some bank. We denote the set of possible portfolios
by Φ.
Each investment type k generates a random return Rk. There is a portfolio maintenance cost c > 0






where Iφik>0 is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if φik > 0 and 0 otherwise. The portfolio main-
tenance cost c captures monitoring or research costs related to each investment type, or the diluting of
special expertise when banks hold more diversified portfolios.
Financial Network. Also in period 1, banks form financial claims on each others’ investment portfo-
lios. We denote these claims by a matrix A where Aij ≥ 0 is the claim of bank i on the return generated
by a counterparty bank j’s investments. Financial claims satisfy ∑i Aij = 1, so the returns generated by
each portfolio go to some bank. Each bank must have weakly stronger claims on its own portfolio than
any other banks, so Aii ≥ Aji for all i and all j. We can represent A as a weighted, directed graph, where
the banks are the nodes and the links are financial claims between banks. So, A is a financial network.
In period 2, returns from the investments realise. The total investment returns flowing to bank i is
its market value, vi. So, the financial network A and investment portfolios Φ chosen in period 1 jointly
determine banks’ realized market values in period 2.
Default. Banks can default. If vi < v in period 2, then bank i is unable to repay its debt holders
in full, which causes i to default. Then default costs lower the returns of i’s portfolio by an amount
β. Default costs include costs associated with liquidating investments, possibly at a discount during
financial turmoil; inefficient allocation of resources during default; and so forth.11





Aij(pj − βIvj<v). (1)
Bank i’s market value depends on its financial claims, Aij, and on counterparties’ portfolio returns, pj.
If j defaults, then i suffers a fall in its market value proportionate to its claim on j’s portfolio. Letting
emboldened variables represent vectors, we can rewrite equation (1) as
v = A(p− b(v)) (2)
where b(vi) = βIvj<v. We show in the Online Appendix, Section OA1, that there exists a vector of market
values v which solves equation (2), and the set of solutions forms a complete lattice. The partial order is
set inclusion across the set of banks that fail.12 So, there is always a solution to equation (2) in which a
11See Cifuentes et al. (2005), Gai and Kapadia (2010) or Caballero and Simsek (2013) for a more detailed treatment of fire
sales in financial networks.
12Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Rogers and Veraart (2013), Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) and Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and
Tahbaz-Salehi (2015a) derive similar results.
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minimal set of banks fail, such that in all other solutions a superset of these banks fail. Throughout, we
focus on the solution in which this minimal set fails.
Risk Sharing. Banks benefit from risk sharing. Through risk-sharing they can avoid default, which
would otherwise lower their market values. Banks share risks in two ways. First, banks hold financial
claims on each others’ portfolios diversifying their real exposures. However, financial claims expose
banks to counterparties’ default costs. Second, banks can diversify their own portfolios directly. Again,
this can help banks can avoid failure in some circumstances. However, more diversified portfolios incur
larger portfolio maintenance costs. For a given bank, either diversified investments or financial claims
may be more valuable. The size of default costs versus portfolio maintenance costs matters. The existing
network of financial claims, and other banks’ investment portfolios also matter.13
Systemic Risk. Financial claims and real investments also create systemic risk: several banks can fail
at the same time. There are two mechanisms leading to systemic risk. First, banks might have the same
real exposures. Several banks might hold the same investment. If that investment has a low return,
several banks can fail. Second, banks might be exposed to one another through the financial system.
Suppose a bank has financial claims on a counterparty. If the counterparty’s portfolio has a low return,
then its market value falls and it may default. If the counterparty defaults, then the bank’s market value
falls even further. So, default costs amplify real shocks across the financial network.
2.2 Equity Value and Limited Liability
Let πi be i’s equity value and δi be i’s value of external debt in period 2. There is limited liability, so
πi = max{vi − v, 0} (3)
δi = min{v, vi}. (4)
When vi ≥ v, bank i does not default. External debtors receive the face value of their debt, v. Bank
i’s residual market value goes to equity holders. When vi < v, bank i defaults. Equity holders receive
nothing and external debtors receive the market value vi, which is less than the face value of their debt.
Example. A simple thought experiment shows how limited liability affects the value of contracts.
Suppose that the return on i’s portfolio falls by some shock of size ε, while all other investment returns
remain constant. After this shock no banks default. The market value of bank j, vj, falls as j’s claims on i
become worth less—specifically, the value of j’s claims on i’s portfolio falls in value by Ajiε. The equity
value of bank i, πi, also falls by Aiiε. Since, by assumption i does not fail, the value of bank i’s external
debt remains a constant v.
Now suppose that ε is sufficiently large that after the shock, vi < v and i defaults, but small enough
that no other bank defaults. As bank i defaults, it incurs default costs that further decrease the return of
its portfolio. Bank i’s equity holders receive nothing after i fails, due to limited liability. Bank j’s claim
on i’s portfolio now falls by Aji(ε + β), due to the added impact of counterparty default costs. The value
of i’s external debt falls by Aii(ε + β), less i’s equity value absent the shock.
13Another important reason for financial connections, distinct from risk sharing, is intermediation (e.g. Farboodi, 2014;
Acemoglu et al., 2015b).
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Figure 2: Example—Equity and External Debt Value with Limited Liability
Notes: Let v′i be the value of i prior to a shock ε to i’s investment. For shocks ε < (v
′
i − v)/Aii bank i does not default and
the losses due to the shock are spread among banks in proportion to their claims on the investment. The shock reduces the
equity value of i (Panel (a)) and the value of a bank j with claims Aji < Aii (Panel (c)). For larger shocks i fails, resulting in
financial distress costs of β that further reduce the cashflows of i’s investment. These losses reduce both the value of external
debt (Panel (b)) and also the value of bank j’s claim on i’s investment (Panel (c)).
Finally, suppose that after the shock both i and j default, but no other banks default. In this case,
j’s claim on i continues to fall by Aji(ε + β). However, i’s external debtors are exposed to j’s default
costs. The debt value of i now falls by Aii(ε + β) + Aijβ, less i’s equity value prior to the shock. The key
features of these contracts are summarised in Figure 2.14
2.3 Distribution of Investment Returns
We assume a simple process for the distribution of returns on investments. With probability r, a shock
of value ε lowers the return on a single type of investment. The investment is selected uniformly at
random, independent of banks’ portfolios or financial claims. All investment types unaffected by the
shock generate a return R̄. If no shock arrives then all investments return R̄. To simplify algebra we also
define R = R̄− c.
Conditional on its occurrence, the shock is large with probability q and small with probability (1− q),
that is:
ε =
εL > n(R− v) with probability qεS ∈ (R− v, n(R− v)] with probability (1− q). (5)
We also assume that εL ≥ 2εS. Further, small shocks are relatively common compared to large shocks.
Specifically, we assume 0 < q < 1n2 .
Discussion of shock process. A mix of small and large shocks creates a tradeoff between two prior-
ities: first, risk sharing; and second, avoiding systemic risk. First, banks can share the risks associated
with small shocks. These shocks are larger than the equity value of a single bank. Without financial
14Our model entertains two possibilities: (i) financial claims are written on the return generated by an investment after
default costs have been subtracted, in which case financial claims are more senior than external debt; or (ii) financial claims are
written on the return generated by investments, in which case financial claims are as senior as external debt.
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claims or multiple investments, a bank will fail after a small shock hits. But these shocks are small
enough that, under some networks and portfolios, banks can share risks and prevent any defaults. Sec-
ond, large shocks create systemic risk. These shocks are large enough that at least one bank must default
for any network and portfolio, and financial connections can serve to propagate defaults. Indeed, if large
shocks are common, that is, q is large, then the benefits of risk sharing will be small and an unconnected
financial system will be efficient. We assume large shocks are rare to create a tradeoff.15
2.4 Discussion of Model Assumptions
We close the section by discussing some features of our model in more detail.
Model of the Financial Network. We explore a tradeoff between risk sharing and minimizing sys-
temic risk. Our model of financial claims is a simple way of capturing this tradeoff.16 In practice, many
contracts feature this tradeoff. A real-world example, similar to our model, is an unsecured, bilaterally
traded, over-the-counter swap. We briefly discuss two alternative models that do not permit such a
tradeoff. First, a richer contracting space could eliminate the tradeoff. For example, suppose banks i
and j write a contract that induces a cash flow from i to j if a small shock, but not a large shock, hits j’s
portfolio. This contract can prevent j’s default after a small shock, but leaves i unaffected by the large
shock. So, there is no tradeoff. Second, standard debt contracts, as modelled in the financial networks
literature, do not allow risk sharing to prevent defaults. Their value does not fall until a bank defaults,
and so no risks can be shared among banks prior to defaults (see, for example, Eisenberg and Noe,
2001). Of course in practice, the value of debt contracts falls as banks’ default risk rises. Therefore, in a
distressed financial system, debt contracts may behave similarly to the contracts in our model.
External Debt is Fixed. For simplicity, we do not model banks’ choice of external debt in period
0. Instead the face value of external debt is fixed, and not contingent on the financial network or on
portfolio choices. One could imagine, equivalently, that external debtors cannot observe the financial
network when they write contracts.17 In equilibrium, external debtors should correctly anticipate the
structure of the financial network. They should demand returns that compensate them for any risk
associated with the equilibrium financial network and portfolios, and v will be set accordingly. By taking
the external debt of banks as given when banks form the financial network and choose portfolios, we
do not model this step explicitly. However, our main results are all consistent with such behavior. We
return to this issue at greater length in Section 4, when we discuss equilibrium behavior.
Relation of Model to Stylized Fact. Recall the stylized fact from the introduction: German banks
with similar real investments have larger financial claims on each other. Our model lets banks choose
both real investments and financial claims. So, we can investigate what mechanisms might reproduce
the stylized fact. We can ask whether the pattern is socially efficient, or whether the pattern generates
systemic risk.
Our model of financial claims is consistent with German interbank lending, at least in a stylized
sense. In the German data, we do not observe the exact contracts used by banks. We cannot see whether
15In the Online Appendix, Section OA2 we generalise the shock distribution in several respects.
16See Cabrales et al. (2017), Wang (2014) and Cabrales et al. (2015) for models of the financial network that also capture this
tradeoff.
17Caballero and Simsek (2013) point out that inter-bank financial networks are highly opaque, especially to outsiders.
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the contract is collateralised, a cashflow swap, a standard debt contract, or some more complicated
instrument. Instead, we observe quarterly net transfers between banks. Given this ambiguity, we model
a general contract, which summarizes banks’ incentives to share risks.
3 Social Efficiency
This section characterizes socially efficient networks and portfolios. Banks hold different portfolios of
investments from their close financial counterparties. This finding contrasts with our stylized fact: in
German data banks hold similar investments to their close financial counterparties.
3.1 Social Planner’s Problem
We start by setting up the social planner’s problem.
Social planner. The social planner chooses the financial network and the set of investment portfolios
at time t = 1, before investment returns are realized. The social planner maximises the sum of expected
equity and external debt value. The social planner therefore has a utilitarian objective function. How-
ever, as all agents in our model are risk neutral and utility is transferable, an outcome maximises this
objective if and only if it is Pareto efficient.
Participation constraint. We impose a participation constraint on the social planner. The planner
must choose a network and portfolio that does not decrease the expected market value of any bank be-
low its autarky market value—that is, the expected market value if the bank has no financial claims and
holds only a single asset. Since in autarky bank i fails following a large or small shock to its investment,
the participation constraint implies
E[vi(A, φ)] ≥ R−
r
n
(qεL + (1− q)εS + β), (6)
for all i. We denote the set of column stochastic and non-negative matrices satisfying these participation
constraints by A.
The participation constraint requires the social planner to give each bank approximately the same
expected market value. We view the participation constraint as minimal restriction on the planner’s
choices that is also normatively appealing.
Social Planner’s Problem. The social planner chooses a financial network A ∈ A and set of portfo-







πi(A, φ) + δi(A, φ)
]
. (7)
We can simplify the social planner’s problem as follows:
REMARK 1. The social planner’s problem is equivalent to minimising the expected cost of defaults plus
total portfolio maintenance costs, subject to the same constraints.
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3.2 Social Planner’s Solution
To characterize the social planner’s solution, we will define a particular financial network and set of
investment portfolios.
Clustered networks. First we define d∗ to be the unique positive root of
d2i (R− v)β + di ((R− v)(εL − εS)− εSβ) + εS (n(R− v)− εL) = 0. (8)
For the rest of this section we abstract from the integer problems by assuming that
(i) d∗ is an integer; and
(ii) n/d∗ is an integer.
Under the integer assumptions, we can partition the banks into n/d∗ groups of d∗ banks. We refer to
each group as a cluster. Now we define the class of networks A∗(d∗). Letting Gi be the cluster that i
belongs to:
A∗(d∗) :=
A ∈ A :
|Gi| = d∗ for all i ∈ N
A∗ji = AS :=
R−v
εS
for all i, j : Gi = Gj
A∗ji = AW :=
R−v
εL+βd∗
for all i, j : Gi 6= Gj
 .
The class of networks A∗(d∗) are symmetric networks where organizations are partitioned into clusters
of size d∗, with strong financial claims within clusters, and weaker financial claims between clusters. We
say that a network A ∈ A∗(d∗) is d∗-clustered. The network representation of claims for an A ∈ A∗(6)
is shown in Figure 3.
Non-overlapping portfolios. We say that banks have non-overlapping portfolios if each bank’s portfo-
lio consists of a single type of investment, and all banks make different types of investments.
Suppose that banks hold non-overlapping portfolios and the financial network is d∗ clustered. Then
by construction, when a small shock hits any bank i’s investment, A∗jiεS ≤ ∑k∈N AjkR − v so that no
banks default. When a large shock hits a bank i’s investment, banks in Gi default but banks outside Gi
do not default. Thus d∗ banks fail following a large shock to i’s investment and no banks fail following
a small shock to any investment.
We can now state our first key result.
PROPOSITION 1. Under the maintained assumptions, namely integer conditions (i) and (ii) above and
q < 1n2 , there exists an r̄ > 0 such that for all r < r̄ a network A and portfolios φ solve the social planner’s
problem if A ∈ A∗ and portfolios are non-overlapping. Further, as r → 0, a network A and portfolios φ
solve the social planner’s problem only if A ∈ A∗ and portfolios are non-overlapping.
3.3 Intuition and Proof Outline
Intuitively, the networks and portfolios characterized in Proposition 1 are the optimal tradeoff between
the two competing imperatives in our model. First, the social planner shares risks when small shocks
arrive, by preventing any defaults. Second, the social planner minimizes systemic risk when a large
shock arrives.
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Figure 3: A network in the class A∗(6), with 4 groups and 6 banks in each group.
There are several steps to proving the Proposition. First, we show that for r sufficiently small the
planner will always choose to share risks through financial claims, instead of having banks hold port-
folios of multiple investments. This simplifies the problem, allowing us to restrict attention to non-
overlapping portfolios.
Second, we show that perfect risk sharing through financial claims, such that Aij = 1/n for all i, j,
has fewer expected defaults than any network in which a small shock leads to at least one failure. With
perfect risk sharing, banks only fail after large shocks. Large shocks are sufficiently rare that the social
planner prefers to avoid a single failure when a small shock arrives, than multiple failures when a large
shock arrives.
Third, we simplify the problem using the participation constraints. Intuitively, as shocks become
rare, the additional value of risk sharing is small. So, the planner must give each bank i overall claims
on projects that sum to approximately 1 (i.e., ∑j ∑k Aijφjk ≈ 1) to satisfy the participation constraint.
Thus the set A must be in the neighborhood of the set of doubly stochastic and non-negative matrices
(i.e., networks A satisfying ∑i Aij = ∑i Aji = 1 and Aij ≥ 0).
So, the first three steps simplify the social planner’s problem. The problem reduces to choosing a
non-negative and doubly stochastic network that minimises the expected number of failures from large
shocks, conditional on preventing failures from small shocks. While this problem is more tractable than
our starting point, the space of possible networks remains large.
In the fourth step of the proof, we make progress by considering a simpler relaxed problem. The
solution to this problem provides an upper bound on the planner’s objective, or, equivalently, a lower
bound on the expected number of failures. We then show that (i) this bound is achieved by all net-
works in the class A∗(d∗) along with non-overlapping portfolios; and (ii) no other network portfolio
pair achieves this bound.
In this simpler problem, we give up on simultaneously trying to minimise the number of failures
following a large shock to any bank. Instead, we minimize the number of failures following a large
shock to a given bank i, while making sure there is no failure after a small shock. We show that for all
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doubly stochastic network structures A such that no small shock causes at least one bank to fail, at least
d∗ banks fail following a large shock to i.
We formalize the solution to the simpler problem in Lemma 2 in the Appendix. The proof of Lemma
2 works by combining inequalities. Let Di be the set of banks that fail when a large shock hits i. Col-
lectively banks outside Di cannot have overly large claims on banks in Di, otherwise they would fail
following a large shock. Banks within Di can have stronger claims, but not so strong that they fail when
a single small shock hits a bank in Di. Minimising the size of |Di| subject to these constraints implies
minimising di subject to the inequality
d2i (R− v)β + di ((R− v)(εL − εS)− εSβ) + εS (n(R− v)− εL) ≥ 0.
This implies that the number of failures following a large shock to i must be at least d∗, where d∗ is the
unique positive root of the left hand side of the above inequality.
The more general problem of choosing a network structure that simultaneously minimises the num-
ber of failures from a large shock to any investment is harder. One might suspect that the social planner
faces a trade-off, between minimizing the number of failures after a large shock to one investment, and
minimizing the number of failures following a large shock to some other investment.
But in the fifth step, we show there is no tradeoff. We show any network A ∈ A∗(d∗) with non-
overlapping portfolios achieves d∗ failures when a large shock hits any project, and no failures otherwise.
As networks A ∈ A∗(d∗) achieve the upper bound on the planner’s objective identified in Lemma 2, we
have established the if part of Proposition 1.
In the sixth and final step, we establish the only if part of Proposition 1. We show that only networks
A ∈ A∗(d∗) are socially efficient. Obtaining the upper bound in Lemma 2 requires several inequalities
to bind, which pins down the strength of each bank’s financial claims. Specifically, it can be shown that
it is necessary but not sufficient for bank i to have d∗ financial claims of size (R − v)/εS and n − d∗
financial claims of size (R− v)/(εL + d∗β). It turns out that the only way to wire the network, so that
each bank has financial claims with these values and the bound in Lemma 2 is achieved, is to arrange
banks in a d∗-clustered network with non-overlapping portfolios.
3.4 Discussion
Proposition 1 is our first key finding. The social planner optimally chooses a network that is d∗-clustered
with non-overlapping portfolios. We characterise socially efficient networks despite considering a large
space of possible network structures and investment portfolios. We place minimal restrictions on the
structure of the financial network. For example, some banks could have a few large financial counter-
parties, while other banks might have many small financial counterparties. Moreover, each bank can
hold any type of investment.
Absence of homophily. The social planner chooses networks and portfolios without homophily. In
a homophilous network, banks with similar real exposures would have similar financial exposures. By
contrast, in the socially efficient network all banks are connected to one another, albeit with financial
claims of varying strength. But there is no homophily: the social planner chooses non-overlapping port-
folios. Further, while the choice of non-overlapping portfolios is intuitive, it is not obvious. For example,
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Cabrales et al. (2017) find that when banks face uncorrelated real exposures, but are heterogenous in the
marginal shock distributions they face, homophily in the financial network is efficient—it is efficient for
banks’ counterparties to face similar shock distributions.
Relation to stylized fact. In the introduction we present a new stylised fact from the German inter-
bank system, alongside anecdotal evidence from the 2008 financial crisis. Real-world financial systems
do exhibit homophily. Banks with similar real exposures have similar financial exposures, different from
the socially efficient outcome in our model. We will study banks’ incentives to deviate from socially
efficient networks, in Section 4.
Default costs and weak links between clusters. Proposition 1 also allows a better understanding
of the role of default costs in amplifying systemic risk—and how the socially efficient network prevents
such ampification from occurring. The relatively weak financial claims between clusters mitigate the
impact of default costs. These claims are weak but positively valued, since for any A∗ ∈ A∗ we have:
0 < A∗ij = AW < AS = A
∗
jk for Gi 6= Gj = Gk.
Weak links allow the social planner to prevent failures outside the cluster hit by the shock. Banks who
do not initially fail after a large shock to another bank might subsequently fail—exposure to default
costs could cause a second round of defaults. However, in the socially efficient network, the cumulative
impact of the large shock and default costs does not cause failures beyond the cluster hit by the shock.
Instead, the claims between clusters are too weak to transmit the shock outside the cluster. Still, the
weak claims enable risk-sharing between clusters after a small shock. Consequently fewer banks within
a cluster are required in order to absorb the impact of a small shock without default. Therefore weak
claims between clusters allow an optimal trade off between risk sharing and minimizing systemic risk.
It is suboptimal for clusters to be fully segmented, such that no bank holds claims to banks in another
cluster. While full segmentation would prevent any part of the large shock from being transmitted
outside the cluster, it would also prevent sharing of the small shock between clusters. To prevent failures
following small shocks, clusters would then have to be larger, and more banks would fail following a
large shock.18 So, fully segmenting the network and allowing no claims between clusters, increases the
expected number of failures.19
Comparison with the literature. We now place our social planner’s solution in the context of the
literature. Our formal analysis assumes there can be a large or small shock with some probability. Then
neither the empty nor the complete network is optimal.
Suppose instead, there is a single shock. If the shock is small, then a complete financial network in
which Aij = 1/n is socially efficient. This network maximizes risk sharing. If the shock is large, then
an empty network in which Aii = 1 and Aij = 0 for i 6= j. This network minimizes systemic risk. As
the shock increases from being small to large in size according to our definition, the efficient network
changes discontinuously. This discussion echoes results in Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi
(2015a), and their argument that some financial networks may be ‘robust yet fragile’.
Suppose instead, there is a continuous distribution of shocks. Two important results from Cabrales
18In different settings, Blume et al. (2011) and Erol and Vohra (2014) find that socially efficient networks are fully segmented.
19 In the Online Appendix, Section OA3 we present some comparative static results on the size of clusters, number of clusters
and strength of links between clusters.
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et al. (2017) are that when the shock distribution is sufficiently fat tailed, maximal segmentation of banks
is optimal, while the maximal integration of banks is optimal when the distribution is sufficiently thin
tailed. Intuitively, in the fat tailed case, large shocks are sufficiently common that the tradeoff between
avoiding failures from small shocks and preventing systemic risk from large shocks is resolved by the
corner solution that minimizes systemic risk. The opposite is true in the thin tailed case. This provides
an impressive generalization of the insight from Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015a).
The distribution of shocks we study leads to an intermediate case—where it is not optimal to focus
exclusively on either risk sharing or minimimizing systemic risk. Cabrales et al. (2017) also consider this
intermediate case. However, the absence of default costs from their model prevents the pattern of con-
nections in socially optimal networks from being pinned down, although they are able to conclude that
optimal networks feature links of only two different strengths. In this intermediate case, by modeling
financial distress costs, we find that socially optimal networks are d∗-clustered. This yields the insight
that weak, but non-zero, claims between clusters are optimal.
Extensions. Proposition 1 relies on some strong assumptions. In the Online Appendix, Section
OA2, we show some ways in which the insight from Proposition 1 that weak links between clusters are
optimal generalises.
4 Stability of the Social Planner’s Solution
Let us take stock: in socially efficient financial networks and portfolios, banks hold different investments
from their financial counterparties. Further, we will see in this section that the social planner’s solution
is a stable outcome in a decentralized financial system where each bank maximizes its expected market
value. But in German data, banks tend to lend to the same firms and industries as their largest financial
counterparties.
The analysis in the later half of this section arrives at a reconciliation. In the presence of limited lia-
bility, banks seek to hold similar investments to their close financial counterparties, though this pattern
is not socially efficient and generates systemic risk. This behavior is systemic risk shifting.20
4.1 Bank Choices
We allow each bank to choose their portfolio φi ∈ ∆n. We also suppose banks can engage in bilateral
trades. In these trades we permit the banks to exchange their financial claims on each others’ portfolios.
DEFINITION 1. Claims A′ ∈ A can be reached from A through a feasible bilateral trade between i and j if
for all banks k ∈ N:
(i) A′ik + A
′
jk = Aik + Ajk for all k
(ii) Akl = A′kl for all k 6= i, j and all l.
20 We also show in the Online Appendix, Section OA4 that there is a formal sense in which the planner’s solution favors debt
holders over equity holders. This creates a basic tension between the interests of the equity holders and efficient outcomes.
Intuitively, debt holders’ interests are well aligned with the planner’s interests because debt holders like to avoid failures.
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Bilateral trading is intended to capture decentralized trade in inter-bank markets.21,22 We assume
that each bank’s level of external debt, v, holds constant when banks change either portfolios or financial
claims.23
4.2 If Banks Maximize Market Value, the Social Planner’s Solution is Stable
We begin by assuming that banks seek to maximise their expected market value, summing both debt
and equity value. In this case, we will see that the social planner’s solution is stable. So, the difference
between market and equity value, due to limited liability, is crucial.
A network portfolio pair is stable if two conditions are met. First, no bank can unilaterally change
its portfolio to strictly increase its expected market value. Second, no bank can change its portfolio, and
simultaneously agree a bilateral trade with another bank to change its financial claims, so that these
changes strictly increase its expected market value and do not lower the other bank’s expected market
value.
DEFINITION 2. A network portfolio pair (A, φ) is stable if and only if
(i) for all φ′ = (φ′i , φ−i) such that φ
′
i ∈ ∆n, E[vi(A, φ′)] ≤ E[vi(A, φ)]; and
(ii) for all φ′ = (φ′i , φ−i) such that φ
′
i ∈ ∆n and for every pair of banks i, j ∈ N, if for all feasible bilateral
trades between i and j yielding claims A′ either
E[vi(A′, φ′)] ≤ E[vi(A, φ)] or E[vj(A′, φ′)] < E[vj(A, φ)].
In our stability definition, banks unilaterally change portfolios but bilaterally adjust their financial
claims. Thus a network portfolio pair is unstable if a single bank wants to change its portfolio holding
fixed the portfolios of the other banks. We interpret this as an implicit market clearing condition—if
there is positive excess demand for an investment, then the network portfolio pair is unstable. While
we think it is natural to model portfolio choices as being unilateral, our financial claims are inherently
bilateral and require a contract to be written between two banks. Hence we require a pair of banks to
find a mutually valuable change in financial claims for the network portfolio pair to be unstable.
Under our definition of stability, banks’ incentives are not generally aligned with the social planner.
Bank i wants to implement a change in φi that increases its market value E[vi(A, φ)], even if other banks’
expected market values decline by more than i’s market value increases. Similarly, banks i and j will
engage in trades that raise their joint market value, even if these trades cause other banks’ expected
market values to decline by more than i and j gain. Nevertheless, the social planner’s solution is stable.
PROPOSITION 2. There exists a r̄ > 0 such that for all r < r̄ all socially efficient network portfolio pairs
(A∗, φ∗) are stable.
21For related studies of network formation financial markets see Farboodi (2014); Erol and Vohra (2014); Erol (2015); or
Acemoglu et al. (2015b).
22A large share share of inter-bank trading is bilateral or over-the-counter, as opposed to centralized or exchange traded
(BIS, 2015).
23Subsection 4.3 discusses the robustness of our conclusions to this assumption.
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The potential for systemic risk creates strong externalities that are not being internalised. Still, there
are no deviations away from the planner’s solution that raise market value. The reason why the social
planner’s solution remains stable in the presence of these externalities is because the connectedness of
the socially efficient network helps align incentives. Changes that impose losses on third parties cause
new failures. By the connectedness of the socially optimal network, these losses affect the banks who
deviate from the socially efficient network portfolio pair. So, despite the rich set of available deviations
in either portfolios and/or financial claims, there is stability.
Example. Consider a socially efficient network portfolio pair (A∗, φ∗), and label investments so
that φ∗ii = 1 for all i. Suppose now that bank i decides to change its portfolio. Suppose it still makes
investments only of one type, but now instead of choosing investments of a different type from all other
banks, i chooses the same investment type as bank j. Suppose further that j is in the same cluster as i
(j ∈ Di(A∗)). Such a change lowers the market value of other banks. Now when the small shock hits
the investment type j both i and j suffer direct losses, causing all the banks in their cluster to fail. The
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. (10)
The change in i’s portfolio choice causes failures that would otherwise not have occurred, and these
losses are passed around the banks in the system. Comparing equations (10) and (9) shows how these










As such, even though the change in portfolio choice by i imposes large negative externalities on other
banks that i does not internalise, the deviation also reduces i’s expected value making the deviation
unprofitable.
4.3 If Banks Maximize Equity Value, the Social Planner’s Solution Is Not Stable
By contrast, when banks maximize expected equity value, the social planner’s solution is no longer
stable. Limited liability creates a wedge between equity and market value. So, in a precise sense, limited
liability leads equilibrium behavior to differ from the socially efficient outcome.
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Suppose that banks maximize expected equity value, that is




vi(A, φ)− v, 0
}]
. (11)
We adjust the definition of stability accordingly.
DEFINITION 3. A network portfolio pair (A, φ) is stable under limited liability if and only if
(i) for all φ′ = (φ′i , φ−i) such that φ
′
i ∈ ∆n, E[πi(A, φ′)] ≤ E[πi(A, φ)]; and
(ii) for all φ′ = (φ′i , φ−i) such that φ
′
i ∈ ∆n, and for every pair of banks i, j ∈ N, if for all feasible
bilateral trades between i and j yielding claims A′ either
E[πi(A′, φ′)] ≤ E[πi(A, φ)] or E[πj(A′, φ′)] < E[πj(A, φ)].
PROPOSITION 3. For any socially efficient network portfolio pair (A∗, φ∗) with d∗ ≥ 2, (A∗, φ∗) is not
stable under limited liability. Further,
(i) each bank i has a unilateral deviation from (A∗, φ∗) to (A∗, φ′) for φ′ = (φ∗−i, φ
′
i) that raises its
expected equity value.
(ii) for each bank i there exists a bank j such that i and j have a feasible bilateral trade from (A∗, φ∗) to
(A′, φ∗) that strictly increases the expected equity value of both i and j.
Proposition 3 shows that the social planner’s solution is not stable under limited liability. Banks
have valuable deviations that raise the probability of a bank’s failure, but also raise the bank’s expected
equity value.
Examples. To gain intuition, consider an example of a portfolio deviation that raises expected equity
value. Suppose that bank i changes its portfolio. Instead of holding a portfolio consisting only of invest-
ments of type i, bank i holds a portfolio consisting only of investments of type j, the same investment
as another bank in i’s cluster. This change causes i to fail when a small shock hits investment j. But the
failure does not lower i’s equity value. By limited liability, i’s equity value after this deviation is zero.
Prior to the change, in the social planner’s solution, i’s equity value is also zero. Further, when a shock
now hits investment type i, no banks are affected and i has positive equity value, whereas before it had
zero equity value. Overall, i’s expected equity value increases. Importantly, i is more likely to fail after
the deviation. But the default costs affect i’s external debt holders and not i’s equity holders, due to
limited liability.
As a second example, banks can deviate with bilateral trades. Consider banks i and j in different
clusters. Consider a feasible bilateral trade that increases i’s claims on banks within i’s cluster, while
eliminating i’s claims on j’s cluster. This trade increases the equity value of bank i when the small shock
hits j’s cluster—i is no longer exposed to the small shock. Further, bank i’s equity value does not change
when a small shock hits its own cluster. Though i now fails, its equity value is zero due to limited
liability. Prior to the deviation, i’s equity value is also zero when a small shock hits its cluster, though
i does not fail. So after the deviation, i raises both its probability of failure and its expected equity
value—by taking advantage of limited liability.
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Our stability concept entertains general deviations, in which banks can adjust both their portfolios
and their financial claims. However, the proposition shows restricted deviations still render the social
planner’s solution unstable. There are valuable deviations in which banks hold fixed their portfolios
and only change their financial claims. There are also valuable deviations in which banks hold fixed
their financial claims and only change their portfolios. Therefore the instability result does not rely on
the interaction between banks’ real and financial exposure. Banks can adjust either their financial or their
real claims, to make a profitable deviation.
Role of assumption: face value of external debt is fixed. We assume that banks take the face value
of external debt as fixed when contemplating deviations. However, for our results, this is consistent
with external debt being endogenously determined and reflecting the risks debt-holders expect to face
before financial claims and portfolios are chosen.24 We expect external debtors to anticipate and adjust
the cost of their debt to account for risks associated with the financial network formed and portfolios
chosen—while leaving this step unmodelled. Our results on the social planner’s solution, the stability
of these efficient network and portfolio pairs when banks maximize their expected market values and
the instability of these efficient network and portfolio pairs when banks maximize their expected equity
values all require us to consider only the level of external debt that would obtain when external debt
holders anticipate the social planner’s solution will be played. As banks are symmetric in the social
planner’s solution our assumption that external debt is v for all banks is consistent with this. Of course,
the return required by debt holders will be different under other stable network and portfolio pairs. In
combination with the huge space of possible networks portfolio pairs, this presents a further difficulty
characterizing the set of stable networks. We do not attempt such a characterization, but this is an
important consideration for future work.
4.4 Systemic Risk Shifting
Limited liability encourages equity holders to raise the probability of default and deviate from social ef-
ficiency. This behavior, often termed risk shifting, is well known (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However
more novel to our setting, risk shifting has consequences for systemic risk—this behavior is systemic
risk shifting. Banks deviate from the social planner’s solution in order to fail at the same time as their
counterparties. So, these deviations raise the probability that a large share of the system will fail at the
same time, after either small or large shocks. Systemic risk increases.
Remark 2 clarifies the nature of systemic risk shifting.
REMARK 2. Letting Pr(x) denote the probability of the event x, bank i’s equity value can be rewritten as

























The first term on the right-hand side of equation (12) is simply the market value of bank i’s when
i does not default. If the default costs were zero, this would be the only term in equation (12). This
24 Implicitly, this requires that external debt holders cannot issue debt conditional on networks and portfolios.
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term captures well-understood risk-shifting incentives of bank i stemming from limited liability. Bank
i would like to increase its market value when it does not fail, but does not care about its market value
conditional on failing. The second term shows that the equity value of i is reduced by the failure of its
counterparties, in the states in which i does not fail. Also, note that portfolio shares and maintenance
costs enter portfolio returns pj, so do not directly appear in equation (12).
The third term in equation (12) captures systemic risk shifting. i’s equity value is greater if it fails at
the same time as its counterparties. Intuitively, suppose i fails in different states from its counterparties.
Then counterparties’ default costs subtract from i’s equity value in these states, lowering expected equity
value. By contrast, suppose i fails at the same time as its counterparties. Then i’s equity value is zero.
Due to limited liability, counterparties’ default costs do not subtract from i’s equity value. Instead,
counterparty default costs lower the value of i’s external debt. This force enables banks’ deviations
from the social planner’s solution to raise equity value. Moreover, if banks fail at the same time as their
counterparties, systemic risk is higher.
Our model lets banks adjust either their investment portfolios or their financial claims. Proposition 3
shows that banks can use either portfolios or financial claims to make deviations that raise equity value.
Systemic risk shifting is the reason. By changing either portfolios or financial claims, banks raise the
likelihood of failing at the same time as their counterparties.
Relation to stylized fact. Recall the stylized fact from the introduction. German banks have similar
investments to their close financial counterparties. Recall, also, the social planner’s solution. In contrast
to the stylized fact, banks hold different investments from their financial counterparties, in the socially
efficient outcome. Systemic risk shifting is a reconciliation. Systemic risk shifting means banks find it
privately beneficial to have the same real exposure as their financial counterparties. This pattern is not
socially efficient, and generates systemic risk.
4.5 Systemic Risk Shifting in Other Networks and Portfolios
We now show that the valuable deviations available to banks, starting from the social planner’s solu-
tion, are also available in many other networks and portfolios. So, systemic risk shifting matters more
generally.
LEMMA 1. For any network portfolio pair (A, φ), bank i can increase its expected equity value by devi-
ating to (A, φ′) if
(i) there is an investment type k such that Aiiφik > 0 and vi(A, φ) ≥ v conditional on a small shock
hitting investments of type k;
(ii) there is an investment type l such that vi(A, φ) < v + (1− q)AiiφikεS conditional on a small shock
hitting investments of type l.
We prove Lemma 1 constructively. The deviation that raises equity value is to a portfolio φ′i such
that φ′ij = φij for all j 6= k, l, φ′ik = 0 and φ′il = φil + φik. Under this deviation, bank i’s value is unaffected
when a shock hits a bank j 6= k, l. When a small shock hits assets of type l, bank i’s equity value falls
by at most (1− q)AiiφikεS. Bank i’s profits can fall no further due to limited liability. On the other hand,
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when a shock hits assets of type k, i’s equity value now increases by at least AiiφikεS. When a large shock
hits investments of type l and k the analysis is similar. Overall, expected equity value increases.
Lemma 1 underscores the importance of systemic risk shifting. Equity holders frequently face in-
centives to hold the same investments as their largest counterparties, while increasing systemic risk.
Suppose for example that bank j is a large counterpary of bank i and bank j’s portfolio consists of in-
vestments of type l. Then, conditional on a small shock hitting investment type l, bank i will suffer direct
losses before any bankruptcy costs of AijφjlεS. A sufficient condition for bank i’s value to then be less
than v + (1− q)AiiφikεS when a small shock hits assets of type l is then that (Aijφjl + Aiiφil)εS > R− v.
This condition is easier to satisfy when bank j is a large counterparty of bank i, bank j’s portfolio consists
of investments of type l and bank i also has large holdings in investments of type l.
Systemic risk shifting in other papers. In a non-network, two-bank setting, Acharya (2009) iden-
tifies the same systemic risk shifting mechanism, and coins the term. Subsequent to us, Jackson and
Pernoud (2019) build on our foundations to investigate further the interaction between real exposures
and financial connections in a more general network setting, with more general contractual forms deter-
mining the financial interdependencies between banks. The phenomena we study persists in this setting
absent limited liability because there is still a complementarity between the returns of banks and their
counterparties—banks want to avoid failure when their counterparties earn high returns, and fail when
counterparties make large losses. This further emphasises the importance of considering banks’ joint
problem of choosing financial connections and exposures to the real economy when designing regula-
tions.
5 Stylised Fact
In this section, we flesh out the stylised fact we presented in the introduction—that German commer-
cial banks lend more to each other when they have more similar real exposures. The relationship is
statistically significant, quantitatively large, and robust across numerous specifications.
To test our hypothesis that banks lend more to banks with similar real exposures, we use quarterly
data on all of the roughly 170 commercial banks in Germany from 2006/Q1 to 2014/Q4.25 As dis-
cussed at some length in the introduction, among German commercial banks interbank loans represent
a substantial and systemically important financial connection, while loans to firms are an important and
substantial asset class generating meaningful real exposures.26 More generally, lending to the corporate
sector is a growing threat to financial stability worldwide, due to rapid growth in leveraged lending.27
Our focus on corporate lending reflects these concerns.
We use quarterly data from the German large credit registry. This data contains detailed information
25The German banking system has about 1, 900 banks today. Crucially, the German banking system has a three-pillar struc-
ture with, in addition to the commercial banks, about 1, 000 cooperative banks and about 450 savings banks (as well as a
number of subsidiaries of foreign banks and banks with a special purpose). Cooperative and savings banks do not usually
access the entire interbank market, but rather transact through their respective head institutions. By focusing on commercial
banks only, we avoid these institutional differences.
26While we cannot rule out the possibility that some of these loans are syndicated, syndicated loans make up a small fraction
of all loans to non-financial firms in Germany and even fewer of these are in syndicates with other German banks. More details
on the syndicated loan market in Europe can be found here.
27See, for example, FOMC (2018), BoE (2018), IMF (2018) or BIS (2018)
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about bank-firm lending collected under the German Banking Act which requires all financial institu-
tions located in Germany to report the end-of-quarter value of every loan to a firm based in Germany,
provided the loan exceeded EUR1.5 million during the preceding quarter. The credit registry is exten-
sive and covers well over 90% of all interbank loans and more than 70% of all bank-firm loans. The
interbank data contains net liquidity flows between banks in each quarter, but does not report the exact
financial instrument used (i.e. loan or bond).
Using these data, we first define our dependent variable log(Amountij,t) as the log of the amount of
interbank lending from bank i to bank j at date t, normalised by the total interbank lending of bank i
at date t. Our main independent variable is a measure of portfolio similarity between lender bank and
borrower bank.28 This can be measured as follows: consider every bank-firm loan as a vector along
a basis in a vector space where each direction corresponds to a specific asset class. An investment of
EUR10 million in asset A is then defined as a vector of length 10 along direction A. The portfolio of each
bank can then be represented by a vector in this K dimensional vector space (where K is the number of
firms in the dataset, in our case around K = 230, 000). The similarity of two portfolios can then easily be





(xki,t − xkj,t)2 (13)
where xki,t is bank i’s holding of asset k in quarter t. Two banks have a high portfolio similarity if they
have a low Euclidean distance. In some specifications we use the normalised Euclidean distance, which
we compute using portfolio weights instead of the exposures themselves: wki,t = xki,t/Xi,t, where Xi,t
is the total bank-firm lending at date t. For robustness, we consider a second measure of the similarity

















as a robustness check for our main specifications.
For our main specification, we focus on the intensive margin, using an unbalanced panel with the
amount of additional interbank lending from bank i to bank j in period t as the panel variable. Our main
specification is:
log(Amountij,t) = βit + β jt + βij + βt + γlog(Distanceij,t) + ε ij,t.
log(Amountij,t) is the log of the amount of interbank lending from bank i to bank j normalised by the
total amount of interbank lending by bank i at date t. log(Distanceij,t is the Euclidean distance between
two banks’ portfolios. We also include a quarterly time fixed effect, annually varying borrower and
28Only a fraction of all commercial banks in Germany are publicly listed. Consequently, market-based measures of corre-
lation like CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016) can be computed only for a subset of banks in our sample. However,
as Abbassi et al. (2017) show, market-based measures of interdependence are a good proxy for correlations obtained from
bank-level credit register data.
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lender fixed effects, as well as a borrower-lender pair fixed effect to account for unobserved heterogene-
ity. This is an extremely strong set of fixed effects so that time-varying bank controls add very little
explanatory value and do not change our results qualitatively.29 Since the large credit registry only re-
ports exposures, but not flows, we compute the amount of new credit provided from i to j using the
difference of the exposure from i to j in t, minus the exposure from i to j in t − 1 (i.e. in the previous
quarter). We have used the convention that a negative flow from i to j is a positive flow from j to i so
that we can take the log of the amount as main dependent variable. Using this convention, banks lend
more to similar banks if the sign of γ is negative.
Results are shown in Table 2 in Appendix A for our main result and in Table 4 for a robustness
check using cosine similarity as our measure of the similarity between banks’ real exposures. In all
specifications, banks lend more to partners with similar exposures to the real economy. The effects are
statistically significant and also quantitatively substantial. In all specifications, the relationship remains
significant and large. We saturate our estimation with a large set of fixed effects to control for unob-
served heterogeneity.30 We always include a time fixed-effect to control for trends. In model (1) we also
include lender and borrower fixed effects. In model (2) we use yearly varying lender and borrower fixed
effects, which controls for a substantial amount of unobserved variation and additionally a borrower-
lender pair fixed effect. In model (3) we furthermore include a borrower-lender fixed effect, i.e. one
fixed effect per borrower-lender pair.31
In Panel A we compute the normalised Euclidean distance based on banks’ co-investment in firms.
Most banks only have few firms in common, however, since the total number of firms is relatively
large compared to the number of firms commercial banks invest in. We find strong evidence for our
hypothesis in all three specifications. Next, in Panel B, we use the lagged non-normalised Euclidean
distance as the explanatory variable. This allows us to investigate whether our results are being driven
only by banks’ different portfolio sizes. As results remain statistically significant homophily is present
in banks’ portfolio compositions, rather than just their portfolio sizes.
As previously discussed, our theory predicts a positive correlation between firms’ real and finan-
cial exposure, without asserting causality. Thus we can formulate our empirical question via the co-
movement of variables, without having to establish claims about causality. Irrespectively, it is interest-
ing to investigate whether lagged Euclidean distance explains banks propensity to link to each other.
Panel C reports on this exercise. Finally, in Panel D, as alternative measure of how dissimilar banks’
portfolios are, we classify loans into one of 74 sectors and apply the Euclidean distance measure in this
space.
In all four estimations we find strong empirical evidence for our hypothesis that banks tend to lend
to banks that are similar to themselves. Our results are qualitatively robust to further robustness checks,
29We also added controls from detailed monthly balance sheet information, using Bundesbank’s balance sheet statistics
(BISTA). These controls did not change our results qualitatively. Results for this specification are available upon request.
30In particular, this accounts for the possibility that a lender is a core bank, while the borrower is a periphery bank. Since we
even include time-varying lender- and borrower fixed effects, we even allow for the possibility that this feature changes over
time.
31Even though we have winsorized the bank-firm and bank-bank exposures at the 5% and 95% level, our results could
still be driven by a few outliers. Figure 1 from the introduction shows that this is not the case. In this figure we plot the
residuals from regressing the dependent and independent variable on time-varying borrower and lender fixed-effects, as well
as borrower-lender fixed-effects.
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including: (i) using an alternative measure of similarity based on the cosine similarity of both banks’
portfolios as shown in Panel A of Table 4; and (ii) adding a set of bank-specific control variables to control
for observed heterogeneity. Our results are economically significant. As we report in the introduction,
when the Euclidean distance between two banks decreases from the 75th to the 25th percentile, i.e. when
their non-financial similarity increases, their net lending grows by roughly 26%.32
In Table 3 we consider the extensive margin of loan creation. We create a binary variable that takes
a value of one if banks i and j have an interbank loan with one another at date t, and zero otherwise.
The results from this balanced panel are reported in Panel A. In Panel B we explicitly study the creation
of new loans. The dependent variable is ENTRYij,t which equals one if there exists an interbank loan
from bank i to bank j at date t that did not exist on date t− 1. We find overwhelming support for our
hypothesis.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper made two contributions. First, we presented a new stylized fact from the German banking
system. Banks have similar real exposures to their financial counterparties. So, if German commercial
banks lend to one another in the interbank market, they tend to lend to similar non-financial firms.
Second, we rationalised this behaviour and showed it generates systemic risk. We presented a model
with limited liability, real investments, and a financial network. We characterised socially efficient net-
works. In these networks, which minimise systemic risk, banks have different real exposures from their
counterparties. Absent limited liability, banks have no incentive to deviate from the socially efficient
network. But limited liability leads banks to deviate from social efficiency and engage in systemic risk
shifting. Banks increase their equity values by having the same real exposures as their close financial
counterparties. Then banks fail at the same time as their counterparties, raising their expected equity
value but also increasing systemic risk.
Policymakers emphasize jointly considering financial and real exposures when minimising systemic
risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). Much anecdotal evidence points in this direction.
We provide theory and evidence showing that the joint behavior of real and financial exposures matters
for systemic risk.
We close with a caveat. Our model predicts only a correlation between banks’ real and financial ex-
posures and is silent on causality—it does not matter whether banks adjust their real exposures in light
of their financial exposure, or adjust their financial exposure in response to real exposures. We have, in
effect, considered both alternatives. If we changed the model so that banks could only engage in uni-
lateral deviations to change the correlation of their real exposures with their counterparties, the socially
efficient outcome would be stable when banks maximise their values, but not when they maximise their
equity values under limited liability. If we changed the model so that banks could only engage in bi-
lateral trades to change their financial exposures while holding their real exposures fixed, the socially
efficient outcome would be stable when banks maximise their values, but not when they maximise their
equity values under limited liability as long as failure costs are not too high. Regardless of these details,
the stylised fact presented in Section 5 is consistent with our model.
32 This is based on model (1), Panel A from Table 2 and the percentile variables presented in the summary statistics (Table 1).
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A Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics for dependent and independent variables
N mean median sd p25 p75
log(Amountij,t) 33, 891 −6.247527 −5.973928 3.310431 −8.446989 −3.763935
log(Distanceij,t) 33, 891 14.4612 14.7249 1.352575 13.8095 15.3281
log(NormDistanceij,t) 33, 891 0.2540417 0.186755 0.1677311 0.1317385 0.3378451
log(SectorDistanceij,t) 33, 891 15.61501 16.13923 1.373794 15.23235 16.4708
Note: log(Amount)ij,t is the log of the amount of interbank lending from bank i to bank j normalized
by the total amount of interbank lending by bank i at date t. log(Distanceij,t) is the log of the Euclidean
distance of portfolio choice of banks i and j. log(Distanceij,t−1) is the lagged log of the Euclidean distance
of portfolio choice of banks i and j. log(NormDistanceij,t−1) is the lagged log of the Euclidean distance of
the relative portfolio weight (the amount lent from bank i to firm k normalized by the total portfolio size
of bank i) of banks i and j. And log(SectorDistanceij,t−1) is the lag of the log of the Euclidean distance of
portfolio choices of banks i and j based on their investment not into individual firms, but into sectors of
the economy.
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Table 2: Interbank lending and portfolio distance – intensive margin
PANEL A – OVERLAP IN FIRM EXPOSURE – NORMALIZED DISTANCE
log(Amountij,t) (1) (2) (3)
log(NormDistanceij,t) −1.509∗∗∗ −2.965∗∗∗ −0.696∗
(−4.53) (−4.58) (−1.70)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender + Borrower FE Yes − −
Time-varying Lender + Borrower FEs No Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE No No Yes
N 33, 885 33, 745 33, 048
R2 (adjusted) 0.247 0.276 0.491
PANEL B – OVERLAP IN FIRM EXPOSURE – DISTANCE
log(Amountij,t) (1) (2) (3)
log(Distanceij,t) −0.608∗∗∗ −0.892∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗
(−9.14) (−10.97) (−2.40)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender + Borrower FE Yes − −
Time-varying Lender + Borrower FEs No Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE No No Yes
N 33, 885 33, 745 33, 048
R2 (adjusted) 0.417 0.448 0.592
PANEL C – OVERLAP IN FIRM EXPOSURE – LAGGED DISTANCE
log(Amountij,t) (1) (2) (3)
log(Distanceij,t−1) −0.533∗∗∗ −0.759∗∗∗ −0.0559
(−7.59) (−10.02) (−0.75)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender + Borrower FE Yes − −
Time-varying Lender + Borrower FEs No Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE No No Yes
N 17, 854 17, 595 17, 034
R2 (adjusted) 0.428 0.472 0.596
PANEL D – OVERLAP IN LAGGED SECTORAL EXPOSURE
log(Amountij,t) (1) (2) (3)
log(SectorDistanceij,t) −0.672∗∗∗ −0.716∗∗∗ −0.186
(−10.07) (−10.56) (−1.24)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender + Borrower FE Yes − −
Time-varying Lender + Borrower FEs No Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE No No Yes
N 17, 854 17, 595 17, 034
R2 (adjusted) 0.438 0.477 0.596
Note: The dependent variable is always log(Amount)ij,t, the log of the amount of interbank lending
from bank i to bank j normalised by the total amount of interbank lending by bank i at date t. The
independent variables are: (i) log(NormDistanceij,t), the log of the Euclidean distance of the relative
portfolio weight (the amount lent from bank i to firm k normalised by the total portfolio size of bank i)
of banks i and j; (ii) log(Distanceij,t), the log of the Euclidean distance of portfolio choice of banks i and
j; and (iii) log(Distanceij,t−1), the lagged log of the Euclidean distance of portfolio choice of banks i and
j; (iv) log(SectorDistanceij,t−1), the lag of the log of the Euclidean distance of portfolio choices of banks
i and j based on their investment not into individual firms, but into sectors of the economy. Standard
errors are always clustered at the borrower and lender level.
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Table 3: Interbank lending and portfolio distance – extensive margin
PANEL A – EXTENSIVE MARGIN
1ij,t (1) (2) (3)
log(NormDistanceij,t−1) −0.307∗∗∗ −0.385∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(−8.12) (−6.31) (−3.13)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender + Borrower FE Yes − −
Time-varying Lender + Borrower FEs No Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE No No Yes
N 134, 400 134, 400 134, 400
R2 (adjusted) 0.154 0.193 0.335
PANEL B – NEW CREATION OF LINKS
ENTRYij,t (1) (2) (3)
log(NormDistanceij,t−1) −0.102∗∗∗ −0.0683∗∗∗ −0.0156
(−5.98) (−3.45) (−0.71)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender + Borrower FE Yes − −
Time-varying Lender + Borrower FEs No Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE No No Yes
N 134, 400 134, 400 134, 400
R2 (adjusted) 0.025 0.038 0.050
Note: In Panel A, the dependent variable is 1ij,t, a dummy variable that equals one if there is a loan from
i to j at date t and zero otherwise. In Panel B the dependent variable is ENTRYij,t, a dummy variable
that equals one if a loan is created between banks i and j at date t that did not exist at date t− 1, and
zero otherwise. The independent variable is in both cases log(NormDistanceij,t), the log of the Euclidean
distance of the relative portfolio weight (the amount lent from bank i to firm k normalised by the total
portfolio size of bank i) of banks i and j. Standard errors are always clustered at the borrower and lender
level.
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Table 4: Interbank lending and portfolio distance – robustness checks
PANEL A – INTENSIVE MARGIN
log(Amountij,t) (1) (2) (3)
log(CosineSimilarityij,t−1) 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0995∗∗∗ −0.0297
(6.16) (4.82) (2.31)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender + Borrower FE Yes − −
Time-varying Lender + Borrower FEs No Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE No No Yes
N 26, 174 25, 983 25, 488
R2 (adjusted) 0.28 0.309 0.500
PANEL B – EXTENSIVE MARGIN
1ij,t (1) (2) (3)
log(CosineSimilarityij,t−1) 0.891∗ 1.398∗∗∗ −0.0470
(1.95) (2.68) (−0.17)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender + Borrower FE Yes − −
Time-varying Lender + Borrower FEs No Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE No No Yes
N 79, 873 79, 806 79, 691
R2 (adjusted) 0.182 0.219 0.350
PANEL C – FREQUENTLY INTERACTING PAIRS ONLY
log(Amountij,t) (1) (2) (3)
log(NormDistanceij,t) −1.427∗∗∗ −3.081∗∗∗ −0.589
(−4.16) (−4.39) (−1.56)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender + Borrower FE Yes − −
Time-varying Lender + Borrower FEs No Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE No No Yes
N 31, 303 31, 163 30, 466
R2 (adjusted) 0.239 0.269 0.486
Note: In Panel A, the dependent variable is log(Amount)ij,t, the log of the amount of interbank lending
from bank i to bank j normalised by the total amount of interbank lending by bank i at date t. In Panel
B, the dependent variable is 1ij,t, a dummy variable that equals one if there is a loan from i to j at date t
and zero otherwise. In Panel B the dependent variable is ENTRYij,t, a dummy variable that equals one
if a loan is created between banks i and j at date t that did not exist at date t− 1, and zero otherwise.
The independent variable is in both cases log(CosineSimilarityij,t), the log of the cosine similarity of
the relative portfolio weight (the amount lent from bank i to firm k normalised by the total portfolio
size of bank i) of banks i and j. In Panel C we have restricted the sample on infrequent linkages only,
i.e. on borrower-lender pairs that have a connection with one another at most 20% of the time. The
independent variable is log(NormDistanceij,t−1) the lagged log of the Euclidean distance of the relative
portfolio weight (the amount lent from bank i to firm k normalized by the total portfolio size of bank i)
of banks i and j. The computation is conditional on two banks having at least one exposure in common.
Standard errors are always clustered at the borrower and lender level.
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B Omitted Proofs
B.1 Proof of Remark 1






















Noting that E[pj] = R̄− rE[ε]/n− ∑k cIφik>0; and that ∑i∈N Aij = 1 because the dependency matrix is























Since all but the final two term of the above equation are exogenously given, the social planner max-
imises E [∑i∈N πi + δi] by minimising the expected cost of defaults less portfolio maintenance costs.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1: Preliminaries
We begin by stating and then proving a Lemma. We define a network to be η-doubly stochastic if it is
column stochastic and ∑j Aij ∈ [1− η, 1 + η] for all i.
LEMMA 2. If banks have non-overlapping portfolios there exists a η̄ > 0 such that for all η < η̄, in all
η-doubly stochastic network structures A for which no small shock always causes at least one bank to
fail, at least d∗ banks fail following a large shock to i.
Let A(η) be the set of non-negative, η-doubly stochastic, n-by-n matrices. Let Di(A) be the set of
organizations that fail following a large shock to i, and set di(A) = |Di(A)|. Now consider the following
problem,
P1: minA∈A(η) di(A) subject to AjkεS ≤ (1 + η)R− v for all j, k ∈ N
As A must be η-doubly stochastic the equity value of each bank absent a shock is at least (1− η)R− v
and at most (1 + η)R − v. As by definition each organization j /∈ Di does not fail following a large
shock to i, an upper bound on the losses absorbed by banks not in Di after a large shock to i is then (n−
di)((1 + η)R − v). The remaining losses must be absorbed by the remaining banks. Thus collectively








≥ εL + diβ− [n((1 + η)R− v)− di((1 + η)R− v)]. (15)
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d2i (R(1 + η)− v)
εS
. (17)
Combining inequalities (15), (16) and (17)
f (di) := d2i
[




((1 + η)R− v)(εL − εS)− εSβ
]
+ εS[n((1 + η)R− v)− εL] ≥ 0.
For all η sufficiently small, as εL > n(R− v), the constant term of this quadratic equation is always neg-
ative; and the quadratic coefficient is always positive. It follows from the quadratic formula that f (di)
always has exactly one positive real root, which we denote by d∗i (η). Moreover, as f (di) is increasing in
di at d∗i (η), for values of di < d
∗
i (η) the constraint is violated ( f (di) < 0). Thus dd∗i (η)e is the unique
solution to P1.
Now consider the value of d∗i (η) as η → 0. By the quadratic formula the positive root of the inequal-
ity, d∗i (η), is continuous in η. Moreover, by Remark 2 in Section OA3 of the Online Appendix, d
∗
i (η) is
decreasing in R and so is also decreasing in η. Thus, for all η > 0, d∗i (η) < d
∗
i . Finally, as by assumption
d∗i is an integer, for all η sufficiently small, dd∗i (η)e = d∗. Hence, for all η sufficiently small, the unique
solution to P1 is d∗.
We now argue that the solution to P1 provides a lower bound on the number of failures that will hit
following a large shock to i, subject to there being no small shock that always causes at least one bank to
fail. Bank j’s equity value in any state of the world in which a small shock hits k’s project is at most
∑
l
Ajl R− AjkεS − v = ((1 + η)R− v)− AjkεS,
The constraint that no small shock always causes at least one bank to fail, therefore implies that Ajk ≤
((1 + η)R − v)/εS for all j, and all k. This is the constraint imposed in P1, and so the solution to P1
provides a lower bound on the number of failures that must be incurred following a large shock to i, if
a network is chosen that avoids there being a failure for sure after a small shock hits any bank.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 1
There are five steps to the proof: First we show that the planner will always choose non-overlapping
portfolios. Second we show that there can be no small shock that results in one or more failures in a
socially optimal network. Third, we show that the participation constraints mean that for all η > 0,
there exists a r̄ > 0 such that for all r < r̄ the social planner must choose a η-doubly stochastic network.
Fourth, we apply Lemma 2 to show that all d∗-clustered networks with separate shocks are socially
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optimal for all r > 0 sufficiently small. Finally, we show that all socially optimal networks are d∗-
clustered with non-overlapping portfolios for r > 0 sufficiently small.
Step 1: Non-overlapping portfolios.
Consider any feasible portfolio φ and network A, where φ does not satisfy the non-overlapping port-
folios condition. This generates claims for each bank i on assets of type k equal to ∑j Aijφjk. Consider
now the alternative network portfolio pair φ′ and network A′. We let φ′ be the non-overlapping port-
folios in which each bank i only makes investments of type i. Thus φ′ii = 1 and φ
′
ij = 0 for all i and all














Thus the network A′ is non-negative and column stochastic, and thus feasible.
Suppose then the planner chooses the network portfolio pair (A′, φ′) instead of (A, φ). Suppose first
that r = c = 0. Then (A′, φ′) and (A, φ), by construction, generate exactly the same market values for
all banks in all states of the world. Thus the planner would be indifferent between them. Suppose this
leads to a value of V for the planner’s objective. Now consider the case in which r = 0, but c > 0. In this
case the planner’s objective decreases by a strictly positive amount ζ > 0.





∑j ∑k cIφik>0. The first term in the objective can differ under the network portfolio pairs (A
′, φ′) and
(A, φ) as in the two cases different numbers of banks may fail in different states of the world. However,
the value of this difference in the planner’s objective is bounded from above by rnβ (supposing there are
never any failures in one case and that all banks fail following any shock in the other case). However,
for all c > 0 there exists a r̄ > 0 such that for all r < r̄ we have rnβ < ζ. Thus, for all r sufficiently
small, the planner always chooses non-overlapping portfolios. For the remainder of the proof we use
this result and restrict attention to non-overlapping portfolios.
Step 2: No small shocks cause any failures. We show that the planner always chooses a network
satisfying this by demonstrating that any network in which a small shock causes at least one failure is
dominated by the complete network in which Aij = 1/n for all i and all j.
Under the complete network, the average value of a bank (assuming non-overlapping portfolios and
recalling that R = R̄− c) is
R− (1− q)rεS/n− qr(εL + nβ)/n.
The first term is the average project return absent any shocks, the second term represents losses from
small shocks, which never result in a failure, and the third term represents losses from large shocks
which always result in n failures.
An upper bound (that is not achievable) on the average value of a bank when there is a one project
that when hit by a small shock always results in at least one failure, is given by the average value that
would result assuming there are never any failures from any shocks to other projects and there is exactly
one failure following a small or large shock to this project. This upper bound is:
R− (1− q)rεS/n− qrεL/n− rβ/n2.
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The first term is the average returns absent any shocks, the second term represents direct losses from
small shocks, the third term represents direct losses from large shocks, and the fourth term represents
losses from a project that results in one failure when it is hit by a small (or large) shock. This fourth term
is given by the product of the probability a shock hits the project in question (r/n) and the average loss
per bank from a failure (β/n). Thus a sufficient condition for the complete network to be preferred is
that q < 1/n2, which holds by assumption.
Step 3: Row stochasticity. We now show that for r sufficiently small the planner will choose an
approximately doubly stochastic network. We do so in two steps. First we show that there exists a row
stochastic network satisfying the participation constraints for all r ∈ [0, 1]. We then show that for all
η > 0 there exists a r̄ > 0 such that for r < r̄, any network that is not η-doubly stochastic will violate a
participation constraint.
It is straightforward to verify that any network A ∈ A∗ satisfies the participation constraints for all




(qεL + (1− q)εS + β) . (18)




(qεL + (1− q)εS + qd∗β) .
By inspection, the participation constraint (equation 18) is continuous in r and limr→0 vi(A) =
∑j AijR ≥ R for all i. This is equivalent to ∑j Aij ≥ 1 for all i. As, by column stochasticity, ∑i ∑j Aij = n,
if there is any i such that ∑j Aij > 1 there must exist a k such that ∑j Akj < 1 implying that at least one
participation constraint will be violated in the limit. Thus, in the limit, satisfying all the participation
constraints requires the network to be doubly stochastic. Further, by the continuity of the participation
constraint in r, for all η > 0 there exists a r̄ > 0 such that for r < r̄, any network that is not η-doubly
stochastic will violate a participation constraint.
Step 4: d∗-clustered networks obtain the bound. By Step 2, for all socially optimal networks there
are never any failures following a small shock. By step 3, for all η > 0, there exists a r̄ > 0 such that
for all r < r̄ the planner must choose a network that is η-doubly stochastic. Thus, there exists a r̄ > 0
such that for all r < r̄ the lower bound on the expected number of failures that must occur when a large
shock hits a given organization i that we found in Lemma 2 holds in all solutions to the social planner’s
problem. Specifically, Lemma 2 shows that in a socially optimal network there must be at least d∗ failures
following a large shock to any project for all r > 0 sufficiently small.33 We show now that all networks
A ∈ A∗ achieve this bound simultaneously for all i when r is sufficiently small.








if Gi 6= Gj.
33 The lower bound d∗, given by the positive root of f (di) as defined in equation (18), was obtained by minimising the
number of failures when a large shock hits bank i without regard to how many banks fail following a large shock to other
banks. Thus any network can at best achieve the lower bound of d∗ failures following a large shock to all banks i while having
no failures otherwise, and any such network will be socially optimal.
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(iii) |Gi| = d∗ for all i ∈ N.
If a small shock hits a bank i (and no other bank is hit by a small shock at the same time) then j’s
equity value will be R− v− AjiεS. Substituting in the possible values of Aji above, if j ∈ Gi then this
equity value is weakly positive and j does not fail while if j 6∈ Gi then this equity value is strictly positive
and j does not fail. Thus there are no failures following a small shock if there are separate shocks. If a
large shock hits any bank i then j fails if j ∈ Gi, but if j 6∈ Gi then j’s equity value is R− v− AjiεL− Ajid∗β,
which is weakly positive and so j does not fail. Thus the lower bound characterised in Lemma 2, is
obtained and there exists a r̄ > 0 such that for all r < r̄ networks A ∈ A∗ are socially optimal.
Step 5: Only d∗-clustered networks obtain the bound. We now show that only networks A ∈ A∗
can be socially optimal for r sufficiently small.
By step 2 all socially optimal networks must have no failures following any small shock, and by
Lemma 2, for r sufficiently small all socially optimal networks must have exactly d∗ failures following
every large shock. The proof of Lemma 2 first placed an lower bound on the number of failures for
η-doubly stochastic networks of d∗(η), and then showed that dd∗(η)e = d∗ for all η sufficiently small.
Obtaining the lower bound d∗(η) required inequalities (15), (16) and (17) to all bind. By inequality (16)
we must have ∑j∈Di Aji = di(R(1 + η)− v)/εS. As there are no failures following a small shock, we also
know that Ajk ≤ (R(1 + η)− v)/εS for all j, k, and so we must have Ajk = (R(1 + η)− v)/εS, for all
j, k ∈ Di and for all i ∈ N.
There then exists a η̄ > 0 such that for all η < η̄ the following argument holds: If j, k ∈ Di then
AjkεL > R(1 + η) − v. This implies that j fails following a large shock to k, and so j ∈ Dk. Hence
Dk ⊇ Di. As i ∈ Di, we conclude that i ∈ Dk. But then, if j, i ∈ Dk then AjiεL > R− v and j also fails
following a large shock to i. Thus Di ⊆ Dk. Combining set inclusions we conclude that Di = Dk for
all k ∈ Di. Hence to achieve the lower bound for all i ∈ N, the set of banks N must be partitioned into
disjoint subsets such that when a large shock hits the investment of any bank in the set, all banks in the
set default.
As inequality (15) in the proof of Lemma 2 must bind to achieve the bound, the losses collectively
absorbed by banks j /∈ Di after a large shock to investment i are (n − d∗(η))(R(1 + η) − v). As each
of these banks is not in Di, the most losses any one of them can absorb is R(1 + η)− v (otherwise they





= R(1 + η)− v, (19)





= R(1 + η)− v, (20)
Rearranging equation (20), and as Di = Dh for all h ∈ Di,
Ajh =
(




for all j /∈ Di and for all h ∈ Di. Thus Ajk = Ajh for all j /∈ Di and for all k, h ∈ Di, and so
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Ajh =
R(1 + η)− v
εL + βd∗
, (21)
for all j /∈ Di and for all h ∈ Di.
Combining the conditions we have found, for all η sufficiently small, any network A that achieves








if Di 6= Dj.
(iii) |Di| = d∗(η) for all i ∈ N.
As there are by assumption no integer problems, d∗ = limη→0 d∗(η) and n/d∗ are integers. Moreover,
as argued in the proof of Lemma 2, d∗(η) is continuous in η and converges to d∗ from below as η → 0.
Thus for all η sufficiently small dd∗(η)e = d∗.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Let ωLk and ωSk denote the states of the world in which a large shock and small shock hits investments
of type k respectively. Consider a socially optimal network portfolio pair (A∗, φ∗), and without loss
of generality let φ∗ii = 1 for all i. Define the set of network portfolio pairs D by the pairs consisting of
networks A′ that can be reached via a feasible trade between i and j from A∗, and portfolios φ′ = (φ∗−i, φ
′
i)
such that φ′i ∈ ∆n. The following four lemmas are helpful.
LEMMA 3. For all (A′, φ′) ∈ D if φ′ik > 0 for k 6= i then
(i) If k ∈ Di and j 6∈ Di then all banks Di \ {i} fail in state of the world ωSk, while if k ∈ Di and j ∈ Di
then all banks Di \ {i, j} fail and at least one of i and j fail in state of the world ωSk.
(ii) If k 6∈ Di then all banks N \ {i, j} fail and i and/or j fail in state of the world ωLk.
(iii) If k ∈ Di and A′ = A∗ then all banks Di \ {i} fail in state of the world ωSk.
(iv) If k 6∈ Di and A′ = A∗ then all banks N fail following a large shock to assets of type k.
LEMMA 4. For all (A′, φ′) ∈ D, in state of the world ωLk
(i) If k 6∈ Di and k 6∈ Dj then banks Dk fail. If k 6∈ Di but k ∈ Dj, then banks Dj \ {j} fail and j and/or
i fail.
(ii) If k ∈ Di \ {i} and j 6∈ Di then banks Di \ {i} fail and i and/or j fail.
(iii) If k ∈ Di \ {i} and j ∈ Di then banks Di \ {i, j} fail and i and/or j fail.
(iv) If k ∈ Di \ {i} and A′ = A∗ banks Di fail.
LEMMA 5. For all η > 0 and all (A′, φ′) ∈ D there exists a r̄ > 0 such that for all r < r̄ if vi((A′, φ′)) ≥
vi((A∗, φ∗)) and vj((A′, φ′)) ≥ vj((A∗, φ∗)), then 1− η < ∑m A′jm < 1 + η and 1− η < ∑m A′im < 1 + η.
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We refer to new counterparty losses as losses incurred in a state of world ω that would not have been
incurred in the same state of the world ω for (A∗, φ∗).
LEMMA 6. If φ′ik > 0, k 6∈ Di and vi((A′, φ′)) + vj((A′, φ′)) ≥ vi((A∗, φ∗)) + vj((A∗, φ∗)) then the new
expected joint counterparty losses of i and j under (A′, φ′) are at least
2(d∗AS + (n− 2d∗)AW)βrq
n
.
Unilateral Deviations We begin by considering unilateral deviations so that (A′, φ′) = (A∗, φ′).
Note that
E[vi(A∗, φ′)] = R̄− r
(
d∗AS + (n− d∗)AW
n
)









We therefore have that
E[vi(A∗, φ′)]−E[vi(A∗, φ∗)] ≤ β ∑
l




vl < v|A∗, φ′
]
(22)
The inequality will hold with equality when i’s portfolio φ′i contains only one asset type, and otherwise
with strict inequality. Equation 22 show that the profitability of the deviation can be evaluated by con-
sidering the expected counterparty losses that i incurs. Following a deviation there must exist a asset
type k 6= i such that φik > 0. We break this down into two cases, k ∈ Di and k 6∈ Di.
If k ∈ Di then by part (iii) of Lemma 3, all banks Di \ {i} fail following a small shock to assets of
type k. Thus the deviation generates new expected counterparty losses for i of AS(d
∗−1)βr(1−q)
n , where
AS(d∗ − 1)β are the losses incurred conditional on a small shock hitting assets of type k, and r(1− q)/n
is the probability of this happening. By parts (i) and (iv) of Lemma 4, as for socially optimal network
portfolio pairs, banks Dl fail when a large shocks hits a bank l 6= i for any φ′i ∈ ∆n. Thus, the most that
i can save in expected counterparty losses are the losses associated with the failures that occur when a
large shock hits assets of type i under (A∗, φ∗). The maximum possible value of these savings to i is
ASd∗βrq
n . Thus the deviation is unprofitable because






where the inequality follows from q < 1/n2.
If k 6∈ Di then by part (iv) of Lemma 3 all banks N will fail following a large shock to assets of type k.
This generates new counterparty losses for i of (ASd
∗+AW(n−2d∗))βrq
n . Again an upper bound on what can
saved from a deviation is ASβrqd
∗
n and so, as






the deviation is unprofitable.
Bilateral Deviations
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We will use v′l in place of vl(A
′, φ′) and v∗l in place of vl(A
∗, φ∗) for all l to save on notation. We
will show that the overall change in expected values for banks i and j when moving from the network















































Pr [vl < v|A∗, φ∗]− Pr
[
vl < v|A′, φ′
])
(23)
This first inequality holds with equality when i’s portfolio φ′i contains only one asset type and otherwise







Inequality (23) show that for there to be a jointly profitable deviation for banks i and j they must reduce
their joint expected counterparty losses.
CASE 1: Di = Dj
By Lemma 4 the only possible failures that might be prevented when a large shock hits assets of type
k 6= i, is a single failure of either i or j, and that is only possible for k ∈ Di. The joint expected value
of preventing all such failures to i and j is 2ASβrq(d∗ − 1)/n—banks i and j jointly save costs of 2ASβ
when a large shock hits a bank k ∈ Di \ {i}, and the probability of such a shock hitting is rq(d∗ − 1)/n.
In addition, banks i and j can jointly save at most 2ASd∗βrq/n when a large shock hits bank i. This




We show now, that in fact, in any profitable deviation banks Di will fail following a large shock to
assets of type k ∈ Di \ {i}. For either i or j to survive in state of the world ωLk, its value in this state of
the world has to increase compared to its value under (A∗, φ∗). Without loss of generality, suppose that
bank i survives in this state of the world (as j ∈ Di the argument for j is identical). Then, as k ∈ Di \ {i}
vi(A′, φ′|ωLk) ≥ v = R− A∗ikεS.
We also know, under the assumption that i avoids failure, that
vi(A′, φ′|ωLk) ≤ R ∑
m
A′im − A′ikεL − β ∑
l∈Di\{i}
A′il ,
where the inequality comes from the lower bound on portfolio maintenance costs of c.
Thus we must have
R ∑
m
A′im − A′ikεL − β ∑
l∈Di\{i}
Ail ≥ R− A∗ikεS.
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By Lemma 5, for all η > 0 there exists a r̄ > 0 such that for all r < r̄ we have ∑m A′im ≤ (1 + η). Hence,
for r < r̄, we need
AS − A′ik ≥
AS(εL − εS)− ηR
εL
.
As AS(εL − εS) > 0, there exists a r̄ > 0 such that for all r < r̄ in all profitable bilateral trades, AS(εL −
εS) > ηR. Thus for all r < r̄ we have that A′ik < AS. As the trade must be feasible, this implies that








Thus there is no profitable deviation in which banks Di do not all fail when a large shock hits a bank
k ∈ Di \ {i}.
The only possible remaining gains from a deviation require reducing i and j’s joint counterparty
failure costs when a large shock hits i. Suppose then that there are less than d∗ failures when a large
shock hits assets of type i. We have just shown that if the deviation is profitable and j ∈ Di, all banks Di
fail when a large shock hits assets of type j. But if φ′ii = φ
∗
ii = 1, then a large shock hitting j is equivalent
to a large shock hitting i—in this case banks i and j are symmetric. Thus, for all profitable deviations in
which φ′ii = φ
∗




ii = 1 there
is no scope for i and j avoiding any of the joint counterparty failure costs they incur under (A∗, φ∗) in
a profitable deviation by deviating to a network portfolio pair (A′, φ∗), and so all such deviations are
unprofitable.
We can therefore restrict attention to φ′ii < 1, which implies that there exists a asset type k 6= i such
that φ′ik > 0. Then, by Lemma 3(i), if k ∈ Di then following a small shock to k, banks Di \ {i, j} as well as
i and/or j fail. This generates new expected joint losses for i and j of at least






The inequality just requires that q < (d∗ − 1)/(2d∗ − 1) which holds as q < 1/n2 < 1/3 ≤ (d∗ −
1)/(2d∗ − 1). Thus the deviation is jointly unprofitable.
Suppose now φ′ik > 0 and k 6∈ Di. Then by Lemma 6 there will be expected losses of at least






Thus the deviation is again jointly unprofitable.
CASE 2: Di 6= Dj
By Lemma 4 parts (i) and (ii), banks i and j jointly incur at least the same losses in state of the world
ωLk for k 6= i following a deviation as they do under (A∗, φ∗). Thus an upper bound on the expected
joint losses that can be avoided by a deviation is (AS + AW)d∗βrq/n (the expected losses associated with
a large shock hitting assets of type i). Moreover, by Lemma 4 part (i) if a large shock hits bank j then
banks Di \ {i} will fail and i and/or j will fail. Thus, if φ′ii = 1, then again by symmetry of i and j,
banks Di \ {i} will fail and i and/or j will fail following a large shock to assets of type i. This generates
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expected joint losses of (AS + AW)d∗βrq/n and removes any scope for the deviation being profitable.
We can therefore restrict attention to φ′ii 6= 1. Hence there exists a k 6= i such that φ′ik > 0. By Lemma
3(i) if k ∈ Di then following a small shock to assets of type k at least banks Di \ {i} fail. This generates
expected losses for i and j of at least






and so the deviation is again unprofitable.
If φ′ik > 0 for k 6∈ Di then by Lemma 6 there will be expected losses of at least






Thus the deviation is again jointly unprofitable.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Part (i) In state of the world ωSk, an upper bound on the values of banks can then be found by
assuming no banks fail (or equivalently, setting β = 0). Thus an upper bound on the value of a bank l
such that l ∈ Dk and l 6= i, j in state ωSk is




A′lmφmh ph − c
= R− ASεS − ASφ′ik
= v− ASφ′ik < v. (25)
The first inequality holds because we are assuming no banks fail. The first equality is because R = R̄− c,
and under any feasible trade between i and j, A′lm = A
∗
lm for all m. The second equality holds by the
definition of AS. The final inequality follows from φ′ik > 0. Thus all banks l such that l ∈ Dk and l 6= i, j
fail.
There are then two cases to consider. If j 6∈ Di then we have already shown that all banks Di \ {i}
fail. If j ∈ Di then an upper bound on the average value of banks i and j is











= R− ASεS − ASφ′ikεS
= v− ASφ′ikεS < v
The first inequality holds because the minimum possible average portfolio maintenance costs are c and
because we are assuming no banks fail. The first equality is because R = R̄− c, and under any feasible






jl for all l. Thus, either bank i fails, or bank j fails or both fail.
Part (ii)
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In state of the world ωLk, an upper bound on the values of banks can then be found by assuming no
banks fail (or equivalently, setting β = 0). Thus, for a bank l ∈ Dk and l 6= j




A′lmφmh ph − c
= R− ASεL − AWφ′ik
= v− AS(εL − εS)− AWφ′ik < v (26)
The first equality is because R = R̄− c and under any feasible trade between i and j, A′lm = A∗lm for all
m. The second equality holds by the definition of AS, and the final inequality holds because εL > εS and
φ′ik > 0. Thus all banks in Dk except possibly j fail in state ωLk after a deviation to the network portfolio
pair (A′, φ′).
There are now two cases to consider. First suppose that j 6∈ Dk. Then by the above argument all d∗






jl for all l, an
upper bound on the average value of banks i and j in state ωLk is then































Thus i and/or j must fail.
Suppose now instead that j ∈ Dk. We then only know for sure that banks Dk \ {j} fail. Nevertheless,
bank i or j still fails in state ωLk. Now we have














































The second equality uses the definitions of both AS and AW . Thus again, i and/or j fail.
An upper bound on the value of a bank l 6∈ Dk ∪ {i, j} in state ωLk is then
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vl(A′, φ′|ωLk) ≤ R− AWεL − AWd∗β− AWφ′ikεL
= v− AW β− AWφ′ikεL < v. (27)
Thus all banks l 6= i, j fail, and at least one of i and j fail.
Part (iii)
From part (i) we have already seen that when a large shock hits asset of type k (for which φ′ik > 0),
and k ∈ Di \ {i}, all banks D \ {i} fail if j 6∈ Di. As A′ = A∗ there is no trade, and so it is without loss of
generality to let i’s trade partner be j 6∈ Di, and we can apply the result from part (i).
Part (iv)
From part (ii) when a large shock hits assets of type k (for which φ′ik > 0), and k 6∈ Di \ {i}, all banks
except possibly one of i and j fail. However, if A′ = A∗, then an upper bound on j’s value, that also
applies to i’s value, is
vi(A∗, φ′|ωLk) ≤ R− AWεL − (AW(n− d∗) + AS(d∗ − 1))β− AWφ′ikεL
= v− (AW(n− 2d∗) + AS(d∗ − 1))β− AWφ′ikεL < v.
Thus if A′ = A∗, then following the deviation to (A∗, φ′) with φ′ik > 0, all banks will fail in state of the
world ωLk.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Consider a large shock to bank k 6= i. In this case, an upper bound on the value of a bank l such
that l ∈ Dk and l 6= i, j in state ωLk is




A′lmφmh ph − c
= R− ASεL
= v− AS(εL − εS) < v. (28)
The first inequality is obtained by setting β = 0, the first equality holds because for any feasibly bilateral
trade between i and j A′lm = A
∗
lm for all m. The final equality is from the definition of AS. Thus banks
other than i and j always fail when a large shock hits a bank in their cluster. So, for k 6∈ {Di ∪ Dj} all
banks Dk fail in state of the world ωLk. This proves part (i) for all cases except Di 6= Dj and k ∈ Dj.
If j ∈ Di, an upper bound on the average value of banks i and j in state ωLk for k ∈ Di \ {i} is
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= v− AS(εL − εS) < v. (29)
The reasoning underlying this series of equations is very similar to above. The only notable difference
is that we no longer have A′im = A
∗
im for all m, but for all feasible bilateral trades between i and j we do






jm for all m. Thus if j ∈ Di and k ∈ Di \ {i} at least one of i and j must fail in
state of the world ωLk. Thus there are at least d∗ − 1 failures, and these failures include i and/or j. This
proves part (iii).
Now suppose that j 6∈ Di. Then an upper bound on the average value of banks i and j if large shock
hits a bank k ∈ Di ∪ Dj for k 6= i is




















R− ASεL − AS(d∗ − 1)β
2
+
R− AWεL − AW(d∗ − 1)β
2
= v− AW(d
∗ − 2)β− AS(εL − εS)− (AS − AW)(d∗ − 1)β
2
< v
This series of equations follows a similar logic to those above, but uses the definitions of both AS and
AW when moving to the last equality. As the average value of i and j is lower than v at least one of i and
j must again fail. Thus there are at least d∗ failures, and these failures include i and/or j. This completes
the proof of part (i) and also proves part (ii).
Finally, suppose that A′ = A∗ and consider a large shock to a bank k ∈ Di \ {i}. For all banks l ∈ Di
vl(A∗, φ′|ωLk) ≤ R− ASεL
= v− AS(εL − εS) < v.
Thus all banks in Di fail.
B.7 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. In the state of the world in which no shock hits any asset types, under the network portfolio pair
(A∗, φ∗) bank i’s value is equal to R. A lower bound on bank i’s expected value under the network
portfolio pair (A∗, φ∗) is therefore R− r`, where ` is the (finite) maximum losses that bank i occurs in
any state of the world.
For a network portfolio pair (A′, φ′) ∈ D an upper bound on the expected value of bank i is ∑m A′imR.
Thus a necessary condition for the deviation to the network portfolio pair (A′, φ′) ∈ D to increase i’s
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expected value (i.e., for vi((A′, φ′)) > vi((A∗, φ∗))) is that
∑
m
A′imR ≥ R− r`.
Fix any η > 0, then ∑m A′im ≥ 1− r`/R. Set r̄ = ηR/`. Note that r̄ > 0 because ` is finite and R > 0.
Thus for r < r̄ we have ∑m A′im ≥ 1− η.
Repeating the exercise for j, we conclude that ∑m A′jm ≥ 1− η. Moreover, as the bilateral trade that






im) = 2. Hence ∑m A
′
jm = 2− ∑m A′im and we
have 2−∑m A′im ≥ 1− η, which can be rearranged to give ∑m A′im ≤ 1 + η. By a symmetric argument
we also have ∑m A′jm ≤ 1 + η.
B.8 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. As φ′ik > 0 and k 6∈ Di, By Lemma 3(ii) there will be at least n− 1 failures following a large shock
to bank k and only bank i or j might survive. If instead all n banks failed, there will be new expected
joint counterparty losses of
2(d∗AS + (n− 2d∗)AW)βrq
n
. (30)
It remains only to show that for any profitable deviation with φ′ik > 0 and k 6∈ Di, then either (i) all n
banks fail in state of the world ωLk or (ii) if only n− 1 banks fail in state of the world ωLk, then there is
at least one new failure after a large shock to some asset l 6= k.
We will first show that there is no jointly profitable deviation in which bank j survives in state of the
world ωLk, without incurring sufficiently many new expected joint counterparty losses. For j to survive
j must have a value of vj(A′, φ′|ωLk) ≥ v. However, by Lemma 5 and Lemma 3(i)
vj(A′, φ′|ωLk) ≤ R(1 + η)− A′jiφ′ikεL − A′jkεL − (1 + η − A′jj)β.
To show that this implies vj(A′, φ′|ωLk) < v we will put a lower bound on j’s losses in this state of




∗ ≤ AW for all l 6∈ Dj ∪ {i} and either ∑m∈Di A
′
jm/d
∗ ≤ AW or else A′jm ≤ AW for all
m ∈ Di \ {i}.
First, towards a contradiction, suppose that in a jointly profitable deviation A′jl > A
∗
jl , for l ∈ Dj \ {i}.
Then when a small shock hits assets of type l,
vj(A′, φ′|ωSl) ≤ (1 + η)R− A∗jlεS − (A′jl − A∗jl)εS
= v + ηR− (A′jl − A∗jl)εS
By Lemma 5, for r sufficiently small Rη < (A′jl − A∗jl)εS and hence vj(A′, φ′|ωSl) < v. This means
that j fails following a small shock to assets of type l. This generates additional expected new joint
counterparty losses for i and j of at least (AS + AW)βr(1 − q)/n. By equation (22) the deviation is
47
profitable only if it reduces expected joint counterparty losses. The maximum possible reduction in
expected joint counterparty losses from the trade is 2ASβrq/n < 2(AS + AW)βrq/n < (AS + AW)βr(1−
q)/n. Thus the deviation is unprofitable, which is a contradiction. We must therefore have A′jl ≤ A∗jl for
all l ∈ Dj \ {i}.
Now consider a large shock to assets of type l for l 6∈ {Di ∪ Dj}. By Lemma 4 part (i) banks Dl fail.
Thus,
vj(A′, φ′|ωLl) ≤ (1 + η)R− A′jlεL − ∑
m∈Dl
A′jmβ
= v + ηR− (A′jl − A∗jl)εL − ∑
m∈Dl
(A′jm − A∗jm)β
Let ` ∈ argmaxl 6∈{Dj∪Di} ∑m∈Dl A
′
jm and let h ∈ argmaxl∈D` A
′
jl . If ∑m∈D` A
′
jm/d




AW and A′jh > AW , then vj(A
′, φ′|ωLh) < v. If h = k, this implies that j fails in state ωLk which is a con-
tradiction. We can therefore restrict attention to h 6= k. We have already seen that banks Dh and bank j
fail in state ωLh. Further, all banks m /∈ Dh ∪ {i, j} then have values of at most
vm(A′, φ′|ωLh) ≤ R− AWεL − AW(d∗ + 1)β < v,
and so also fail. Thus there are at least n − 1 failures in state of the world ωLh, and this generates
additional new counterparty losses for i and j of






Thus the deviation is unprofitable. Hence, we must have that for all l 6∈ {Di ∪ Dj}, A′jl ≤ AW .
Now consider a large shock to assets of type h ∈ argmaxl∈Di\{i} A
′
jl . By Lemma 4 part (ii), all banks




∗ ≤ AW , or if ∑l∈Di A
′
jl/d
∗ > AW then A′jh ≤ AW . If j does fail, then by the same logic as
above, there will be a cascade of failures in which all banks fail, exceeding the bound on expected new
counterparty losses (30). Suppose then that j fails but not i in state ωLh. As j fails, along with banks
Di \ {i}, all banks m ∈ Dj \ {j} have value
vm(A′, φ′|ωLl) ≤ R− AWεL − (AW(d∗ − 1) + AS)β < v,
and so also fails. But then for any bank h 6∈ {Di ∪ Dj}
vh(A′, φ′|ωLl) ≤ R− AWεL − AW(2d∗ − 1)β < v,
and so all these banks also fail.





AW , or if ∑l∈Di A
′
jl/d
∗ > AW then A′jh ≤ AW .
Recall that for j not to fail when a large shock hits k we need
R(1 + η)− A′jiφ′ikεL − A′jkεL − (1 + η − A′jj)β ≥ R− AWεL − d∗AW β. (31)
By Lemma 5, η can be made arbitrarily small by requiring r to be sufficiently small. Thus the only
possibility for satisfying this inequality is if A′jk < AW , while ∑l A
′
jl = 1 + η. However, as shown above,
we must have A′jl ≤ A∗jl for any l ∈ Dj, or any l 6∈ {Di ∪ Dj}. Moreover, if ∑l∈Di A
′
jl/d
∗ ≤ A∗jl then
there is no remaining scope for reducing A′jk. Thus, we must have ∑l∈Di A
′
jl/d
∗ > A∗jl , which implies
that A′jl ≤ A∗jl for all l ∈ Di \ {i}. Thus the only possibility for reducing A′jk by an amount x, while




ji + η + x. The inequality becomes increasing slack as x increases, so the
best chance of satisfying it is to set x = A∗jk. Even in this case, we will see that inequality (31) is violated.
We then have
vj(A′, φ′|ωLk) ≤ R(1 + η)− (A∗ji + A∗jk)φ′ikεL − (1 + η − AS)β (32)
≤ R(1 + η)− 2AWφ′ikεL − (1 + η − AS)β (33)





∗ − 1)β + (n− 2d∗)AW β− (R− β)η
2AWεL
.
Thus, by Lemma 5, there exists a r̄ > 0 such that for all r < r̄ we require φ′ik < 1/2.
To realize the potential gains from the deviation that can make it profitable, we need to avoid at least
one bank in the set Di \ {i} failing when a large shock hits bank i. This requires that ASφ′iiεL ≤ ASεS,




If φ′ii and φ
′
ik are both less than half, then bank i must hold a third asset q. But by Lemma 4 part (ii),
there are n− 1 failures when a large shock hits q, so we have exceeded the bound on new expected joint
counterparty losses (30). Thus there is no profitable deviation, without either (i) n banks failing in state
of the world ωLk or (ii) n − 1 banks failing in state of the world ωLk and an extra failure after a large
shock hits some other asset l 6= k.
The argument showing there is no profitable deviation in which i does not fail when a large shock hits
k follows the same steps and the full details are omitted for brevity. First, to prevent a large cascade of at
least n− 1 additional failures that would make the deviation unprofitable, banks i’s average dependence
of a set of banks Dl 6= Di cannot increase. Second, to prevent additional failures when a small shock hits
a bank in Di that would make the deviation unprofitable, either i’s average dependency on banks Di
must not increase, or else A′il ≤ AS for all l ∈ Di \ {i}. If i’s average dependency on banks Di does not
increase, then there is no scope for having A′ik < AW , and thus i fails in state ωLk as claimed. If instead
A′il ≤ AS for all l ∈ Di \ {i}, then the only way to have A′ik < AW is to increase A′ii. However, if this
is done by enough to prevent i from failing in state ωLk, then at least banks Di \ {i} fail in state of the
world ωLi, and the deviation is again jointly unprofitable.
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B.9 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Part i. One can easily verify that the network portfolio pair (A∗, φ∗) satisfies the conditions of
Lemma 1. Investment k in Lemma 1 corresponds to investment i in the this proof. Investment l in
Lemma 1 is the investment corresponding to any bank in i’s cluster. So, by that Lemma, there exists a
change in bank i’s portfolio that is profitable.
Part ii. Consider now a deviation from (A∗, φ∗) to (A′, φ∗), reached via a bilateral trade between i
and j 6∈ Di. Specifically, let A′ik = AS + AW for all k ∈ Di, A′ik = 0 for all k ∈ Dj, A′jk = AS + AW for all
k ∈ Dj, A′jk = 0 for all k ∈ Di, and otherwise set A′ik = A∗ik and A′jk = A∗jk. It is easy to verify that this
trade is feasible.
We show now that this trade is strictly profitable for i. Strict profitability for j then follows by sym-
metry. First observe that the value of all banks remains the same in states of the world ωSl and ωLl for
l 6∈ {Di ∪ Dj}.
Next, observe that in states of the world ωSk and ωLk for k ∈ Di we have under the socially op-
timal network portfolio pair that πi(A∗, φ∗|ωLk) = πi(A∗, φ∗|ωSk) = 0. Thus, by limited liability,
πi(A′, φ∗|ωLk) ≥ πi(A∗, φ∗|ωLk) and πi(A′, φ∗|ωSk) ≥ πi(A∗, φ∗|ωSk) = 0.
Moreover, under the socially optimal network portfolio pair, in state of the world ωLk for k ∈ Dj,
πi(A∗, φ∗|ωLk) = 0. This follows from the definition of AW . So, by limited liability, we must have
πi(A′, φ∗|ωLk) ≥ 0.
The only remaining states of the world to consider are ωSk for k ∈ Dj. Following the trade,
vj(A′, φ∗|ωSk) ≤ vj(A∗, φ∗|ωSk)− AWεS = v− AWεS < v
so bank j will now fail. This implies that for banks l ∈ Dj \ {j}
vl(A′, φ∗|ωSk) ≤ vl(A∗, φ∗|ωSk)− ASβ = v− ASβ < v,
and so the failure of j precipitates a cascade of failures in which all banks Dk = Dj fail. However, banks
l 6∈ Dj do not fail. To see that these banks survive, note that if the set of banks Dj, and only the banks Dj
fail, we have
vl(A′, φ∗|ωSk) ≥ R− AWεS − d∗AW β = v + AW(εL − εS) > v,
where the first inequality is tight for all banks l 6∈ Dj \ {i} and the second equality follows from the
definition of AW .
Consider then the value of bank i in this state of the world. We have seen that in states of the world
ωSk for k ∈ Dj, banks Dj fail given (A′, φ∗), while no banks failed for (A∗, φ∗). However, because of the
trade, none of the losses from these failures are incident on i—that is, A′ik = 0 for all k ∈ Dj. Thus we
have
vi(A′, φ∗|ωSk) = R > R− AWεS = vi(A∗, φ∗|ωSk).
Thus the deviation from (A∗, φ∗) to (A′, φ∗) is strictly profitable for i, and by symmetry, strictly profitable
for j.
50






































Pr(vi ≥ v)− β
(


























B.11 Proof of Lemma 1
We prove the result constructively by finding a unilateral portfolio deviation that is always profitable
under the maintained assumptions of Lemma 1. Consider the deviation by bank i from portfolio φi to
φ′i in which i sets φ
′
ij = φij for all j 6= k, l, φ
′
ik = 0 and φ
′
il = φil + φik. Since the deviation is unilateral,
we have φ
′
j = φj for all j 6= i. We let ωLk and ωSk denote the states of the world in which a large, and
respectively small, shock hits assets of type k.
The equity value of all banks is weakly greater in states of the world ωLn and ωSn for n 6= l, m, and
the state of the world in which no shock hits. Firm i pays the same or fewer portfolio maintenance costs,
since i is no longer paying the maintenance cost on asset k. So, in these states, pj is weakly higher for all
banks j, hence all banks’ equity values weakly increase.






































− π (A, φ|ωLl)
])
> 0 (34)
that is, expected profits, conditional on large or small shocks hitting k or l, must increase after the de-
viation. We will calculate the value of each square bracketed term, to show that indeed inequality (34)






− π (A, φ|ωSk) ≥ AiiφikεS. (35)
After the deviation to φ′, bank i weakly lowers its portfolio maintenance costs, since it no longer pays a
portfolio maintenance cost for holding asset k. Bank i’s market value increases directly by AiiφikεS, since
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bank i no longer has a portfolio share in asset k. Bank i’s market value in this state may increase further
since after the deviation, no banks that do not fail under φ fail under φ′ when a small shock hits k; but
some banks that fail under φ may no longer fail under φ′. So, fewer failure costs deduct from i’s market






− π (A, φ|ωSl) > − (1− q) AiiφikεS. (36)
We have π (A, φ′|ωSl) ≥ 0 by limited liability. We have π (A, φ|ωSl) < (1− q) AiiφikεS according to






− π (A, φ|ωLk) ≥ 0. (37)
We know that π (A, φ′|ωLk) cannot be strictly lower than π (A, φ|ωLk), since i is less exposed to the large
shock to investment type k after the deviation. But i could fail even after the deviation, in which case






− π (A, φ|ωLl) > − (1− q) AiiφikεS. (38)
We have π (A, φ′|ωLl) ≥ 0 by limited liability. We have π (A, φ|ωLl) < (1− q) AiiφikεS according to
assumption (ii) of the Lemma.































− π (A, φ|ωLl)
])
> (1− q) (AiiφikεS − (1− q) AiiφikεS)− q (1− q) AiiφikεS
= (1− q) (AiiφikεS − AiiφikεS) = 0
so inequality (34) is satisfied and the constructed deviation is profitable.
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